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INTRODUCTION

Lisa Gersten would have been a much wealthier woman if only her
uncle Seymour had lived another month. It was not that Seymour himself was wealthy. Indeed, he owned no real estate and had never had
much of an income. He had, though, been left a small inheritance by his
parents. Named Seymour’s executor and primary beneficiary, Gersten
discovered numerous storage lockers where Seymour had stashed the
products of what can only be explained as a retail shopping mania:
mountains of XXL and XXXL clothing, purchased with his inheritance.
It took Gersten over a year to settle Seymour’s estate.
Although Seymour was not a wealthy man, he had a lifelong friend,
Alan, who was. Seymour became Alan’s caregiver after Alan had a
stroke. Eventually, Seymour could no longer care for Alan, and Alan
moved into a nursing home. Alan had named Seymour the beneficiary of
his house in the Hamptons, a manse worth several million dollars. But
Seymour died three weeks before Alan. The common law doctrine of
lapse states that the beneficiary of a testamentary gift receives nothing if
he predeceases the testator.1 The property does not go to the predeceasing beneficiary’s estate unless the testator so intends.2 Even if Seymour
had outlived Alan, in some states he would have had to survive him by
at least five days to avoid lapse, in accordance with a trend in the law
toward requiring survival by 120 hours.3
Lapse is a venerable doctrine and a cornerstone of wills law. Its rationale, though, remains murky. As Leonard Levin has observed,
“[L]apse has been largely accepted with little analysis of why the death
of a beneficiary before the testator should produce such an outcome.”4
The doctrine’s blunt, unforgiving application has troubled courts and
policy makers and has given rise to anti-lapse legislation—supposedly
geared toward better carrying out a testator’s probable intent.5 There is
reason to believe, though, that the typical testator does not fully appreciate the lapse doctrine or its various statutory exceptions. Back in 1823,
1

80 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 1408 (2015).
Id.
3
See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC’s New Survivorship
and Antilapse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (1992).
4
Leonard Levin, Lapse and Vesting of Interest Revisited, 3 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 155,
156–57 (1990).
5
See Susan F. French, Antilapse Statutes Are Blunt Instruments: A Blueprint for Reform, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 339 (1985); Mark Reutlinger, Washington’s Other Anti-Lapse
Statute, 39 WASH. ST. B. NEWS, no. 8, Aug. 1985, at 25, 25–26.
2
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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court remarked, “That a legacy lapses by the
death of a legatee in the lifetime of the testator is a consequence known
to few testators . . . .”6 Although it is not known how many testators seek
legal counsel when they finally get around to executing a will, it is
doubtful that in the intervening 175 years testators have become more
aware of how the rule of lapse will affect the distribution of their estates.
It is, furthermore, not clear that the doctrine contributes in any meaningful way to the task of carrying out the testator’s intention, the paramount
objective of wills law.7
This Article examines the rule of lapse, discusses how efforts to reform the damage it does has led to the doctrine of anti-lapse, and advocates an alternative approach. I argue that allowing the provisions of a
beneficiary’s probated will to take the gift where the beneficiary has
predeceased the testator by one year or less would be preferable to the
predominant anti-lapse approach that essentially benefits a narrow set of
the testator’s heirs. The argument herein rests solidly on the conviction
that testators do not have in mind survival when their wills make no such
indication. Thus, bequeathing property without using survivorship language to express the preference that the beneficiary possess and control
it and without providing for a substitutionary gift in the event that the
beneficiary predeceases the testator evinces an intention that the legatee
decide who will take the property if that legatee, in turn, has exercised
her intentionality by executing a valid will of her own. This alternative
approach to what we currently define as lapse would unsettle certain
basic tenets of wills law, namely that a testator’s will controls only the
property he owns at his death.8 The rationale behind this approach, however, is to fashion lapse and anti-lapse rules that are less about creating
efficiency in the administration of estates and more about the paramount
goal of carrying out a testator’s intentions.
My proposal does not chart entirely unfamiliar territory. Indeed, in
a narrower form it was a feature of the English Wills Act of 1837,9 and it
is today found in the law of Maryland, whose statutory alteration of
6

Craighead v. Given, 10 Serg. & Rawle 351, 353 (Pa. 1823). Of course, the legal presumption is that testators are aware of the rule of lapse. See Aldred v. Sylvester, 111 N.E. 914,
915–16 (Ind. 1916); Detzel v. Nieberding, 219 N.E.2d 327, 331 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1966).
7
In re Janney’s Estate, 446 A.2d 1265, 1266 (Pa. 1982) (“[T]he intention of the testator
is of primary importance, the lodestar, cornerstone, cardinal rule.”).
8
In actuality a will may govern the distribution of property an estate acquires after the
testator’s death. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2602(2) (West 2015).
9
Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26 § 33 (Eng.). For further discussion, see John
B. Rees, Jr., American Wills Statutes: II, 46 VA. L. REV. 856, 899 & n.764 (1960).
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lapse dates back to 1810 in what can best be described as its complete
abrogation.10 While support for my proposal could be sought in the doctrine of independent significance or the use of powers of appointment to
complete one’s estate plan—theories I explore below—it is most appropriately grounded in a straightforward use of extrinsic evidence to construe wills, as well as the philosophy of intention. I am, of course, not
arguing that those who are ultimately entitled to a decedent’s property
need not survive the testator, but simply that rules used to identify those
who should succeed to lapsed property have outlived their usefulness.
The remainder of this Article consists of three parts. Part II examines the common law requirement of survival in succession law as a
mechanism for determining entitlement to inherit or to take as a beneficiary under a will. It examines statutory approaches to survival, including the requirement’s role in intestacy law and the most common effort
to circumvent its ill effects in the law of wills, the anti-lapse statute. This
part also focuses on the problem of simultaneous death and examines its
treatment in statutes and uniform laws. Part III probes the interrelationship between efforts to address lapse and efforts to carry out the intention of the testator. This Part urges consideration of a rule that would allow, within certain bounds, a gift to a predeceasing beneficiary to be
distributed to those named in that beneficiary’s will. Part IV considers
whether powers of appointment or the doctrine of acts of independent
significance provide doctrinal support for the proposed rule. In what follows, although I acknowledge that the common law treated lapsed legacies and lapsed devises differently,11 this Article uses the terms legacy,
devise, bequest and gift interchangeably.
II.

THE REQUIREMENT OF SURVIVORSHIP IN SUCCESSION LAW

Survivorship is a central feature of succession law. In intestacy,
heirs must survive the decedent to take a portion of the estate.12 If they

10
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-403 (West 2015) (“[A] legacy may not lapse or
fail because of the death of a legatee after the execution of the will but prior to the death of the
testator . . . .”); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Future Interests Legislation: Implied Conditions of
Survivorship and Substitutionary Gifts under the New Illinois “Anti-Lapse” Provision, 1969
U. ILL. L.F. 423, 424 (1969).
11
Van Kleeck v. Reformed Dutch Protestant Church of N.Y., 20 Wend. 457, 457–58
(N.Y. 1838); Verner F. Chaffin, The Time Gap in Wills: Problems Under Georgia’s Lapse
Statutes, 6 GA. L. REV. 268, 298–99, 303 (1972). Some courts have expressly disapproved of
the distinction. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Caldwell, 85 So. 493, 494 (Ala. 1920).
12
JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 80 (8th ed. 2009).
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do not, their surviving descendants “represent” them and take in their
stead.13 If there are no surviving descendants of a predeceasing heir, the
property goes to the next heir in line, according to a hierarchy established in the applicable intestacy statute.14 If the intestate decedent dies
with no heirs at all, the property belongs to the state.15 With some variation at the margins, intestacy laws are quite similar across the fifty
states.16 They embody the presumed intent of most people who die without making a will to benefit those with whom one has the closest kinship
relationships.17 Such statutes presume, “with little or no discussion,”18
that the decedent would not have wanted his property to go to the estate
of a predeceasing heir.
Survivorship is also an important feature of the common law of
wills. With almost no exception,19 an individual named in a decedent’s
will must survive the testator in order to benefit from it. If that individual
fails to survive, the property that would have devolved to him will be
distributed under the residuary clause of the testator’s will or according
to the rules of intestacy.20 If he does survive, his death before the distribution of the estate’s assets is of no consequence.21 To avoid the disenfranchising effect of lapse in its common law form, the named individual
must survive the testator, if only by the briefest conceivable interval of
time.22
In contrast to wills and intestacy, survivorship is not a common feature of the law of future interests.23 The recipient of a gift of a future interest need not even be alive at the time the gift is made, but must have

13

Id. at 87.
See id. at 88–89.
15
WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES INCLUDING TAXATION
& FUTURE INTERESTS 8 (4th ed. 2001) (defining “escheat”).
16
Brian Peters & Michael Boehlje, A Summary of State Laws of Intestate Property Distribution and Succession 2 (Iowa State Univ. Staff Paper No. 120, 1981).
17
26B C.J.S. Descent and Distribution § 6 n.1 (2015).
18
MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 15, at 420.
19
Two important exceptions are where the beneficiary is a debtor of the testator or vice
versa. 96 C.J.S. Wills § 2079 (2015) (citing In re Tuck, 11 N.Y.S.2d 790, 793 (Sur. Ct. 1939)).
See, e.g., In re Pierce’s Will, 276 N.Y.S. 433, 435 (Sur. Ct. 1934) (providing an exception for
funeral expenses).
20
See generally 97 C.J.S. Wills § 2109 (2015) (stating that the lapse of a residuary bequest will be distributed to the remaining residuary legatees or to the testator’s heirs or next of
kin).
21
In re Hall’s Estate, 71 N.Y.S.2d 825, 829 (App. Div. 1947).
22
Richard W. Effland, Will Construction Under the Uniform Probate Code, 63 OR. L.
REV. 337, 339 (1984).
23
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 853.
14
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the potential of coming into existence. For example, the future interest in
an inter vivos gift of a life estate to X with a remainder to X’s children,
where X has previously died childless, would fail for lack of potential
beneficiaries. If X is alive, however, and has one child, A, then A need
not survive X’s death to be entitled to the property. In the absence of a
condition in the original gift, if A dies before the distribution date—the
death of X—his will or the law of intestacy will direct who will be given
possession.24 Although a frequently litigated question, the law does not
require that someone in A’s position survive to the time of distribution.25
As will be discussed in more detail below, some states have begun to enact statutes that do away with the vested remainder approach and apply
anti-lapse principles to inter vivos trusts.26
It is easy to assume, mistakenly, that the law of future interests is a
contradiction of the law of wills. But a testamentary devise does not
constitute a gift until the testator dies,27 whereas the conveyance of a future interest is a completed gift.28 The law of wills and the law of gifts
are consistent in that they both require recipients of gifts of present possession to be living at the time the gifts take effect. Gifts of future interests, though, postpone possession.29 Since possession is postponed, the
recipients of gifts of future interests need only to have a potential existence when the gift is made.30 If the hypothetical gift described in the
previous paragraph were made under a will, and the gift of the remainder
interest were to Y’s children rather than X’s, X having predeceased the
testator and Y having survived him,31 it is easy to see that the gift to Y’s

24

See, e.g., First Galesburg Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., v. Robinson, 500 N.E.2d 995, 996 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986); In re Estate of Capocy, 430 N.E.2d 1131, 1134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Lyons v.
Lyons, 48 N.E.2d 18, 19 (Mass. 1943); Williams v. Williams, 115 N.W. 342, 345 (Wis.
1908).
25
EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS’ ESTATES
AND TRUSTS 404 n.1, 417 (7th ed. 2006).
26
See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-11 (West 2015).
27
See S.L. v. R.L., 774 N.E.2d 1179, 1181 n.9 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (“[A]n anticipated
inheritance under the will of a living person is considered a ‘mere expectancy[.]’” (quoting
Lauricella v. Lauricella 565 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Mass. 1991))).
28
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 851.
29
See, e.g., 14C MASS. PRAC. SERIES § 15.13 (4th ed. 2014).
30
Id.
31
I have deliberately fashioned a hypothetical that does not trigger the rule of convenience, which dictates that “a class will close whenever any member of the class is entitled to
possession and enjoyment of his or her share.” DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 877
(emphasis in original). Instead, since “no members of the class have been born before the testator’s death,” this hypothetical falls within the exception to the rule that holds the class open
“until the death of the designated ancestor of the class,” here Y. Id. at 878.
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children is valid even if Y has no children.32 As long as Y is alive, her
children have a potential existence and can for this reason be thought of
as having “survived” the testator.33
A. Failure to Survive under the Common Law
1. Lapse
In law, “lapse” means the failure of a right or privilege because of a
contingency that has not been satisfied or a purpose that has failed or become impossible.34 The term is used in various legal contexts, including
the failure of insurance coverage when premiums remain unpaid,35 the
expiration of offers and options,36 and whether the lapse of time renders
evidence inadmissible.37 But the most common use of the term relates to
the requirement that a beneficiary named in a will survive the testator in
order to take the testamentary gift.38 In other words, a testamentary beneficiary’s gift is conditioned on his survival,39 and if he does not survive
the testator, his gift is said to lapse.40 Under the common law, the effect
of the failure to survive makes it as if the name of the legatee is missing
from the will.41 Absent a gift in substitution, whether by statutory dictate
or other provision of the will, the gift will lapse and be distributed according to specific rules.42 Neither the testator’s knowledge of the beneficiary’s death, either before or after the execution of the will, nor the
32

This assumes that the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders has been
abolished in the jurisdiction in question. The Restatement indicates that nearly all states have
abolished it. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 25.5 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
33
For a similar problem, see JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS,
TRUSTS & ESTATES 645 (4th ed. 1990). See also DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 305–06 (8th
ed. 2014) (providing analysis for a similar problem).
34
97 C.J.S. Wills § 2072 (2015).
35
THE GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW: EVERYONE’S LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 71 (7th ed.
1984).
36
C.J.S. Vendor § 16 (2016) (offer to sell or purchase realty); Id. § 159 (options).
37
Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 908 (Tex. 2004) (distinguishing between excited utterances and deliberative statements).
38
See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 21109(a) (West 2015). There are other circumstances
under which lapse occurs listed at 96 C.J.S. Wills §§ 1208–13, 2075–2081 (2015).
39
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603 cmt. (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969) (“Under
the rule of lapse, all devises are automatically and by law conditioned on survivorship of the
testator.”).
40
See In re Estate of McFarland, 167 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tenn. 2005).
41
See Robinson v. McIver, 63 N.C. 645, 651 (N.C. 1869).
42
96 C.J.S. Wills §§ 2084, 2086 (2015).
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devisee’s death testate will change this result.43
A lapsed gift does not pass to the beneficiary or his estate, but is
disposed of in another manner. Generations of law students have had to
master these dispositional rules. The first rule in the cluster relates to the
event that constitutes a lapse. When a beneficiary is alive at the time the
will is executed but predeceases the testator, if the will provides no gift
in substitution, the gift lapses.44 The remaining rules dictate with specificity the disposition of devises in the event of lapse. If the gift is to a
class, the gift is shared by the surviving members of that class,45 the reasoning being that membership in the class is to be ascertained at the time
of the testator’s death, not at the time of the execution of the will.46 It is
not, therefore, possible for the gift to a member of a class to lapse.47 If
the gift is not to a class and is specific or demonstrative, the lapsed portion will be distributed according to the terms of the residuary clause.48
If the bequest to the predeceased individual consists of the residue of the
estate, the bequest will be distributed to the testator’s heirs at law under
the terms of the applicable intestacy statute.49 Thus, the strong presumption in wills law against partial intestacy has an important exception in
the doctrine of lapse. Partial intestacy may result, of course, in some
beneficiaries receiving property under the terms of the will and via intestacy,50 a “mixing” of regimes that was disliked by the common law but
tolerated under the tenet that there is no residue of a residue.51
In sum, lapse is an event and its effects. It is common, though, to
define lapse as constituting either the event or its effects, but not both.
43
See 96 C.J.S. Wills § 2066 (2015). Some courts have, though, entertained assumptions
that by including a named individual in the will, the testator must have believed the individual
to be alive. See Thomas M. Cooley II, “Lapse Statutes” and Their Effect on Gifts to Classes,
22 VA. L. REV. 373, 403 n.90 (1936).
44
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 177 (2015); see also THOMAS E. ATKINSON,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 777 (2d ed. 1953).
45
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 358.
46
THOMAS L. SHAFFER & CAROL ANN MOONEY, THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF
WILLS AND TRUSTS 93 (3d. ed. 1991).
47
Cooley, supra note 43, at 398.
48
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-1(g) (West 2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.500
(West 2015); In re Estate of Stroble, 636 P.2d 236, 241 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Shroeder v.
Bohlsen, 83 S.W. 627, 628 (Ky. 1904); In re McFarland, 167 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tenn. 2005).
49
See, e.g., Quattlebaum v. Simmons Nat’l Bank of Pine Bluff, 184 S.W.2d 911, 913
(Ark. 1945); In re Estate of Russell, 444 P.2d 353, 363–64 (Cal. 1968); McFarland, 167
S.W.3d at 304. This is known as the no-residue-of-the-residue rule. See DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 363.
50
Quattlebaum, 184 S.W.2d at 913.
51
In re Estate of Melton, 272 P.3d 668, 675, 680 (Nev. 2012) (applying a will’s disinheritance provision to block intestate distribution).
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For example, some define lapse merely as the passing of the bequest or
devise into the residue of the estate or by intestacy.52 Others define a
lapsed gift as “one which fails to vest when the time for vesting arrives
by reason of the incapacity or unwillingness of the beneficiary to receive
it.”53 Thus, lapse alternatively refers to the failure of a testamentary gift
due to events occurring after the execution of the will or to the effect of
those events on the ultimate disposition of the subject of the gift. Until a
more rarefied definition or new terminology appears, it is important to
conceive of lapse as encompassing both of these meanings.
The lapse doctrine is a default rule that can be altered by the use of
specific terms in a will that sets up its own rules regarding survivorship.
Bequeathing the property to a secondary beneficiary in the event that the
primary beneficiary does not survive the testator is one such lapseavoidance mechanism. If the primary beneficiary predeceases the testator, then the gift does not lapse but simply becomes the subject of the
provision for substitution of the secondary beneficiary and is carried out
according to its terms, assuming of course that the secondary beneficiary
has not also predeceased.54 Another lapse-avoidance mechanism is for a
will to direct that the property be given to the estate of a beneficiary who
has predeceased him.55 As Patricia Roberts has noted, “Although such
gifts are not recommended, there appears to be no policy reason to prohibit them.”56
2. Voidness
The law distinguishes voidness from lapse. A bequest is void when
one who would otherwise be a beneficiary predeceases the execution of
the will, regardless of whether the testator was aware that the beneficiary
had already died.57 There are other, less common, reasons for declaring a
52

Lapse, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see also Simpson v. Piscano, 419
A.2d 1059, 1064 (Md. 1980) (Cole, J., dissenting). Professor Gardner notes that before the
enactment of statutes allowing wills to control property acquired after the execution of the
will, see, for example, UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-602 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1969), lapsed devises of after-acquired property passed by intestacy. GEORGE E. GARDNER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 575–79 (1903).
53
GARDNER, supra note 52, at 575; see also Chaffin, supra note 11, at 269–70.
54
97 C.J.S. Wills § 2082 (2015).
55
James Morfit Mullen, The Maryland Statute Relating to Lapsing of Testamentary
Gifts, 7 MD. L. REV. 101, 102 (1943).
56
Patricia J. Roberts, Lapse Statutes: Recurring Construction Problems, 37 EMORY L.J.
323, 361 (1988).
57
97 C.J.S. Wills § 2075 (2015) (citing In re Doyle’s Estate, 80 P.2d 374, 375 (Mont.
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bequest void, such as the incapacity of a beneficiary, whether for reasons
of alienage, having served as a subscribing witness, or status as domitae
naturae.58 One court has even deemed a gift to an estate void because
“an estate is not a person or legal entity.”59 Void bequests are “incapable
of taking effect from the time of making the will.”60 Under the common
law, a void bequest was thus not considered lapsed, since the beneficiary
did not survive the will’s execution.61 The disposition of the subject of a
void bequest was also distinct: it passed as intestate property.62 Today,
the dispositional rules relating to void gifts are similar to those relating
to lapsed gifts.63
B. The Policy Behind the Lapse Doctrine
Although the rules governing the disposition of lapsed devises are
clear, the rationale behind the lapse doctrine is not. Wills scholars have
advanced a number of explanations for the persistence of the doctrine.
Jesse Dukeminier and Robert Sitkoff theorize that the lapse rule embodies the fundamental principle that “[a]ll gifts made by will are subject to
a requirement that the devisee survive the testator, unless the testator
specifies otherwise.”64 Thomas Jarman reasons that since wills do not
take effect until the death of the testator, they cannot benefit those who

1938)).
58

See, e.g., In re Estate of Russell, 444 P.2d 353, 363 (Cal. 1968) (bequest to a dog);
Pavlick v. Meriden Tr. & Safe Deposit Co., 107 A.2d 262, 267 (Conn. 1954) (alienage); In re
Hohn’s Estate, N.Y.S.2d 237, 242 (Sur. Ct. 1943) (beneficiary-witness).
59
See 80 AM. JUR. 2D Wills § 1082 (2016) (citing Martin v. Hale, 71 S.W.2d 211, 213
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1954)); In re Glass’ Estate, 130 P. 868, 869 (Cal. 1913). But see Rogers v.
Walton, 39 A.2d 409, 411 (Me. 1943) (recognizing a valid transfer to the estate of a deceased
person); accord Cumming v. Cumming, 135 S.E.2d 402 (Ga. 1964). It is perfectly acceptable
for a testator to bequeath property to another’s estate. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.2 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1999); L.S. Tellier,
Devise or Bequest to Designated Individual “or His Estate,” “or His Children,” “or His Representatives,” or the Like (Other Than “or His Heirs”), As Subject to Lapse in Event of Individual’s Death Before That of Testator, 11 A.L.R.2D 1387 § 3 (1950).
60
GARDNER, supra note 52, at 579.
61
Drafts v. Drafts, 114 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (“[N]o question of
lapse arises.”).
62
SHAFFER & MOONEY, supra note 46, at 93.
63
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 359; GARDNER, supra note 52, at 579. See, e.g.,
Martineau v. Simonson, 69 N.Y.S. 185, 186 (App. Div. 1901) (holding that void gifts to certain members of class passed to other members of that class).
64
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 358. We could just as easily say there is an implied revocation, but that speaks to the operation of lapse and not the policy behind it.
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have predeceased him.65 Mary Louise Fellows believes the rule is justified because “good estate planning would leave the final disposition of
the property in the testator’s control if a beneficiary predeceases a testator.”66 Courts, too, have attempted to explain the policy behind the rule.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has deemed aspects of the lapse doctrine “just, natural, and reasonable,” largely on the basis of stare decisis.67 The court may have had in mind a case from 1568 that justifies the
doctrine on the basis that the rule simply “‘ought to be’” thus.68 These
scholarly and judicial explanations tell us a great deal about what the law
is and what it values, but they tell us little about the role that lapse doctrine is meant to play in forwarding the paramount concern of wills
law—to carry out the intention of the testator. The explanations likewise
present us with no more than conclusory justifications for the tenacity of
the lapse rule. While no one would dispute that a dead person cannot
own property,69 which itself might explain why we have wills in the first
place, commentators and courts make no attempt to explain why, in the
absence of a condition expressed in the decedent’s will, the estate plan
of the predeceased individual may not control the disposition of a lapsed
devise.70 Relinquishing control of property to another is, after all, precisely what a will is meant to do.
A few commentators do discern a connection between lapse rules
and testamentary intentions. One author suggests that doing away with
all lapses would be “too broad to accord with the testator’s probable intention.”71 Adam Hirsch has opined that lapse rules reflect the intent of
the reasonable testator, who knows that “dead persons have no use for
property” and “would prefer to bequeath [it] to someone who is living.”72 Hirsch is undoubtedly correct that the reasonable testator understands that she herself will not own anything after she dies. His theory

65
See Philip Mechem, Some Problems Arising under Anti-Lapse Statutes, 19 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 1 (1933) (citing JARMAN ON WILLS 398 (7th ed. 1930)).
66
Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 637 (1988).
67
In re Estate of McFarland, 167 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tenn. 2005).
68
See Mechem, supra note 65, at 1 n.2 (quoting Brett v. Rigdon, 1 Plowd. 340 (1568)).
69
LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 374, 1066 (3d ed. 2002); UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-603 cmt. (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969).
70
See, e.g., Carpenter v. Miller, 26 S.W.3d 135, 138 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000).
71
Note, Legacies and Devises—Statute Preventing Lapse Held Applicable When Legatee
and Testator Die in Common Disaster, 55 HARV. L. REV. 691, 692 (1942) [hereinafter Legacies and Devises].
72
Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy: the Meaning of the “Fresh Start,” 45
HASTINGS L.J. 175, 238 (1994).
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does not tell us, though, why she necessarily has survival of her beneficiary in mind when her will states no such preference and it cannot be
otherwise established that she wished the beneficiary actually to possess
the property.73 It fails as well to say who a testator desires to possess the
property in lieu of the predeceased beneficiary. The testator, in considering that a beneficiary may predecease her, may just as likely expect that
the property will find its way into the hands of a living person “through
the probate estate of the named beneficiary.”74 As Philip Mechem sees it,
“It is apparent . . . that in many instances [a] testator, if sufficiently informed, would have preferred some representative of the original donee
to take [the property], rather than that the property should pass to his
own heir or residuary legatee.”75
Although Mechem is discussing the narrow anti-lapse statutes we
know today, his insight comports with the theory that a testator may believe that the intended beneficiary’s will is just as suitable a channel for
the distribution of a lapsed bequest as is the residuary of the testator’s
estate or a statute dictating to whom the lapsed legacy will pass. Good
estate planning or not, a testator has no expectation of retaining control
of her property merely because a beneficiary has predeceased her. In the
absence of good counsel, and sometimes even with it, she likely has no
knowledge whatsoever of the rule of lapse. In a world where few testators seek the advice of well-trained lawyers, her true intentions on the
matter will seldom be established.76 What she does understand, however,
is that her own estate plan will control any property to which her estate
becomes entitled after she dies, and she understands this to be true of
other testators’ wills.77 In this sense, she is what I call “wills-minded.”
The wills-mindedness of testators is what makes a rule that takes account of a predeceased beneficiary’s will in carrying out a testator’s estate plan more in keeping with the average testator’s intent in cases of
lapse. We can be even more certain of this intention when “there is little
doubt of the predeceasing legatee’s desire to dispose of his estate in a

73

See, e.g., White v. Brown, 559 S.W.2d 938, 938 (Tenn. 1977) (bequesting a house “to
live in and not to be sold”).
74
Hirsch, supra note 72, at 238.
75
Mechem, supra note 65, at 1.
76
See ATKINSON, supra note 44, at 778.
77
A testator’s will controls the disposition of property that vests in her estate after she
dies. See, e.g., Leary v. Liberty Tr. Co., 171 N.E. 828, 828–29 (Mass. 1930); Bottomley v.
Bottomley, 35 A.2d 475, 484 (N.J. Ch. 1944); Hudson v. Hopkins, 799 S.W.2d 783, 787 (Tex.
App. 1990).
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method counter to the statutory manner of distribution.”78
C. Statutory Alterations of the Common Law Survivorship Doctrine
The remorseless workings of the lapse doctrine have spawned an
immense amount of litigation. Attempts to stem the tide have led to statutory exceptions to lapse. The most well-known of these reforms is antilapse legislation, aimed at better carrying out a testator’s probable intent
when a gift to a relative lapses.79 A reform that also applies to intestate
succession is simultaneous death legislation, designed to eliminate excruciating questions about survival where deaths occur in close temporal
proximity.80 The most recent reforms require heirs or beneficiaries to
survive the testator by 120 hours in order to spare the estate the costs of
being administered twice in a short period of time.81 Despite their salutary aims, these statutory reforms have created new problems that should
motivate us to scrutinize their role in carrying out the intention of testators.
1. Anti-Lapse
Described as “barbarous to the ear” by one commentator,82 the curiously named anti-lapse statutes83 found in most jurisdictions do not so
much overturn the lapse rule as they, in a few specific instances, direct
the disposition of a lapsed devise in a manner divergent from the common law.84 Thus, even statutes that declare that a devise covered by the
anti-lapse statute “shall not lapse”85 mean merely that the distribution of
the property will be different from what the common law dictates. In
most cases, contemporary American statutes direct that a gift that would
otherwise lapse be taken by the surviving issue of the predeceased bene-

78

Note, Anti-Lapse Statutes and the Conflict of Laws, 47 YALE L.J. 1216, 1221 (1938)
[hereinafter Anti-Lapse Statutes].
79
B.E. WITKIN ET AL., SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 262 (10th ed. 2005).
80
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 80.
81
Id.
82
Mechem, supra note 65, at 1 n.*.
83
Anti-lapse statutes are alternatively referred to as lapse statutes. SHAFFER & MOONEY,
supra note 46, at 92; Cooley, supra note 43, at 374. One commentator has suggested “statutory gift-over provision” as a more apt moniker. Suzana Popovic-Montag, Revisiting Section 31
of the Succession Law Reform Act – The “Anti-Lapse Provision,” 23 EST. TR. & PENSIONS J.
266, 267 (2004).
84
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603 cmt. (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969).
85
See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514(9) (West 2015).
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ficiary using a representational scheme similar to that used for intestate
distribution.86 In this regard, they differ from the original English antilapse law, which actually prevented lapse by declaring that the property
“shall not lapse, but shall take effect as if the Death of such Person had
happened immediately after the Death of the Testator.”87 The “fictitious
survivorship” theory that undergirded the English law required distribution of the property as if the legatee had survived the testator,88 that is,
through the estate plan of the predeceased beneficiary. The evident purpose of this approach to lapse is to bestow the property on “those persons ‘who would presumably have enjoyed the benefits of such devise,
had the devisee survived the death of the testator and died immediately
afterwards.’”89 England has since discarded the fictitious survivorship
theory.90 In the United States, fictitious survivorship is embodied only in
the law of Maryland, where the law directs property bequeathed to predeceased beneficiaries to that person’s devisees or heirs.91
The consensus appears to be that “fixing” lapse law in the way antilapse statutes do is a “benevolent design”92 promoting the reasonable
testator’s unarticulated wish that when she bequeaths property to her
close relatives, she intends it to benefit their progeny as well.93 Roger
Andersen reveals himself to be of this view in stating that anti-lapse
statutes reflect the legislative belief “that in some cases [lapse] would be
contrary to a common testator’s intention.”94 Thomas Atkinson describes
anti-lapse provisions as carrying out “the probable intention of the average testator, if he had thought of the possibility of his surviving the lega-

86

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-64(a) (West 2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.273
(West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN § 31-42(a) (West 2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-6-19
(West 2015).
87
Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, § 32 (Eng.); Anti-Lapse Statutes, supra note
78, at 1217–18 (“The words [of the statute] . . . creat[ed] a fictitious survivorship which carries with it all the incidents of an actual survivorship. The gift is pictured as vesting in the legatee, and is disposable by his will.”).
88
Anti-Lapse Statutes, supra note 78, at 1217.
89
McAllister v. McAllister, 167 N.W. 78, 79 (Iowa 1918) (quoting In re Hulett’s Estate,
96 N.W. 952, 953 (Iowa 1903)). Until 1995, Iowa’s anti-lapse statute bestowed lapsed devises
on the devisee’s heirs. In re Estate of Michael, 577 N.W.2d 407, 409 (Iowa 1998). Iowa subsequently amended its anti-lapse statute. The current formulation bestows lapsed devises on
the issue of predeceased beneficiaries. IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.273.
90
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.273; see also MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 15, at 420
n.2. (citing Administration of Justice Act 1982, § 19 (Eng.)).
91
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-403 (West 2015).
92
McAllister, 167 N.W. at 79.
93
Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1129 (1996).
94
ROGER W. ANDERSEN, UNDERSTANDING TRUSTS AND ESTATES 251 (5th ed. 2013).
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tee or devisee.”95 Dukeminier and Sitkoff elaborate: “The idea is that, for
certain predeceasing devisees, the testator would prefer a substitute gift
to the devisee’s descendants rather than for the gift to pass in accordance
with the common law of lapse.”96 The generality of such statements is
probably due to the fact that it is likely not possible to determine whether anti-lapse statutes promote testamentary intent.97 Nonetheless, legislatures have indeed “indulge[d] in generalizations as to the presumed intent of an average reasonable testator” in enacting anti-lapse laws in
nearly every state.98
a. The Mechanics of Anti-Lapse
Anti-lapse statutes are best described as narrow departures from
lapse law because they apply, almost without exception, only to testamentary gifts to certain consanguineous or adopted relatives.99 The relatives covered by anti-lapse provisions vary significantly across states.
Many apply to gifts to the testator’s issue100 or issue and siblings101 (including adopted children, although this was not always so).102 Some variations include gifts to children and grandchildren,103 gifts to any descendant,104 or gifts to the children of siblings.105 Some are more
expansive, extending to the testator’s parents and their descendants,106
grandparents and their descendants,107 great-grandparents and their descendants,108 the testator’s kindred,109 his heirs,110 or even to any benefi95

ATKINSON, supra note 44, at 779; accord Chaffin, supra note 11, at 272.
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 364.
97
Erich Tucker Kimbrough, Lapsing of Testamentary Gifts, Antilapse Statutes, and the
Expansion of Uniform Probate Code Antilapse Protection, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 279
(1994).
98
Mechem, supra note 65, at 2.
99
See, e.g., TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 255.153(a) (West 2015) (including “a descendant of
the testator or a descendant of a testator’s parent”).
100
See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-11(a) (West 2015).
101
See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.3 (McKinney 2015).
102
See, e.g., In re Phillips’ Estate, 17 Pa. Super. 103, 109 (1901) (“‘One adopted has the
rights of a child without being a child.’” (quoting Schafer v. Eneu, 54 Pa. 304, 306 (1867))).
103
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-441 (West 2015).
104
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-1(g) (West 2015).
105
See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514(9) (West 2015).
106
See, e.g., TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 255.153(a) (West 2015).
107
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-224 (West 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-42 (West
2015).
108
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-603(A) (West 2015).
109
See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 21110(c) (West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 335
(West 2015).
96
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ciary.111 Some statutes explicitly include predeceasing spouses;112 others
have been construed as excluding spouses.113 Washington has two antilapse statutes, one that applies to gifts to the issue of grandparents114 and
another that applies to gifts to any beneficiary who cannot be located at
the time of distribution but who has “clearly . . . died prior to the decedent.”115 Both statutes benefit the lineal descendants of the predeceasing
beneficiary. The Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”), more expansive than
most anti-lapse provisions, includes grandparents, the issue of grandparents, and stepchildren.116 Some statutes alter the basic anti-lapse scheme
in certain cases. Pennsylvania, for example, protects the testator’s closest
family members. The issue of the predeceasing beneficiary do not take
if, in lapsing, the legacy would otherwise go to the testator’s children or
spouse under the residuary clause or in intestacy.117
What is not so varied is the application of anti-lapse statutes to class
gifts. As mentioned above, under the common law, class members who
failed to survive the testator were simply not members of the class; their
portion of the gift did not lapse.118 In bequeathing property to a class, the
testator was presumed to intend a gift only to those members of the class
who survived his death.119 Based on this reasoning, an anti-lapse provision would not apply to a class gift.120 Today, even though some statutes
110

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-615(a) (West 2015). The statute reads “relative by lineal descent or within the sixth degree” and is thus congruent with the definition of heirs in intestate
succession. See Id. § 59-509.
111
See D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-308 (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-64(a) (West
2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.273(1) (West 2015) (excepting spouses, IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 633.274); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.400 (West 2015); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS
§ 4-401 (West 2015) (excepting spouses); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-6-19 (West 2015);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-105 (West 2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-3-3 (West 2015).
112
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-615(a).
113
See, e.g., Estate of Dye, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 362, 374–77 (Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Blackman v. Wadsworth, 21 N.W. 190, 192–93 (Iowa 1884).
114
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.110 (West 2015).
115
Id. § 11.76.240; Reutlinger, supra note 5, at 25.
116
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603(b) (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969). See
also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2709 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-35 (West
2015).
117
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514(9) (West 2015).
118
SHAFFER & MOONEY, supra note 46, at 93; Drafts v. Drafts, 114 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (“[A] gift to members of a class cannot lapse so long as any member of
the class survives the testator.”); A. James Casner, Class Gifts—Effect of Failure of Class
Member to Survive the Testator, 60 HARV. L. REV. 751, 761 (1947); Cooley, supra note 43, at
398.
119
Cooley, supra note 43, at 379.
120
See, e.g., Lacy v. Murdock, 22 N.W.2d 713, 718 (Neb. 1946); In re Prejato’s Will, 155
N.Y.S.2d 569, 571 (Sur. Ct. 1956); Cooley, supra note 43, at 377.
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do not explicitly include class gifts,121 there are no anti-lapse statutes
that explicitly exclude them. Courts have been willing to interpret such
statutes as inclusive of class gifts in part on the rationale that “such statutes are remedial and should receive a liberal construction . . . .”122 Another rationale is the testator’s probable intent, a presumed intent supplied by the law.123 The modern trend is decidedly in favor of applying
anti-lapse provisions to class gifts.124 Under such statutes, it can be said
with accuracy that the anti-lapse statute trumps the class gift rule.
Even though there is near uniformity in including class gifts within
the ambit of anti-lapse provisions, there is variation among the states on
the question of whether anti-lapse statutes apply to class members who
predecease the execution of the will. According to the traditional understanding of class gifts, they are not members of the class125 unless the
testator expressly defines the class to include them.126 Another reason for
excluding them parrots the common-law logic regarding void gifts: antilapse statutes do not apply to void portions of class gifts because voidness is distinct from lapse.127 This highly unsatisfying semantic rationale
is contradicted by the UPC,128 whose drafters thought it likely that the
testator would want all predeceasing members of a class treated similarly,129 and by many contemporary anti-lapse statutes that bring class gifts
within their ambit and act equally upon either lapsed or void portions of
such gifts.130 Despite the trend in the direction of including the void portions of class gifts within the ambit of anti-lapse statutes, some states
nonetheless explicitly exclude void portions of class gifts, leaving them

121

See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 142 (West 2015); D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-308
(West 2015).
122
JOHN E. ALEXANDER, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 874 (1917), quoted
in Clifford v. Cronin, 117 A. 489, 490 (Conn. 1922); see also GARDNER, supra note 52, at 446
(stating that anti-lapse statutes “are commonly construed as applying to gifts to a class”).
123
Cooley, supra note 43, at 375, 379.
124
See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.3(a)(3) (McKinney 2015).
125
See, e.g., In re Harrison’s Estate, 51 A. 976 (Pa. 1902).
126
See, e.g., In re Estate of Shappell, 227 A.2d 651, 652 (Pa. 1967) (will included bequest
to children who “shall predecease me in death”).
127
Drafts v. Drafts, 114 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (“[A] beneficiary who
is dead at the time the will is executed is void, and no question of lapse arises.”); MD. CODE
ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-404 (West 2015); Succession Law Reform Act § 23, R.S.O. 1990,
c. S.23 (Can.).
128
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603(a)(6) (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969).
129
Id. § 2-603 cmt.
130
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2313(a)(2) (West 2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 152-605 (West 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-603 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-35
(West 2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-603(B) (2015).
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subject to the common law.131
One common anti-lapse provision that includes any beneficiary is
the statutory abrogation of the rule that a lapsed residuary devise is distributed through intestate succession. This no-residue-of-a-residue rule
has been severely criticized as an override of a testator’s intent not to
benefit his heirs and as a concession to the antiquated English common
law that favored intestacy.132 Some courts have simply ruled that the
lapsed portion of a residuary devise to individuals is shared by the surviving residuary takers.133 Today, statutes in many states embody this
rule.134 The rule prevents the distribution in intestacy of certain lapsed
residuary devises. Like the class-gift rule it resembles, the abrogation of
the no-residue-of-a-residue rule is itself trumped by the anti-lapse statute
in instances where the predeceased residuary beneficiary falls within its
ambit.135
In some cases, an anti-lapse statute will operate in a manner similar
to what the outcome would have been under lapse law, as when the gift
of the entire residue is to a predeceased child whose surviving issue are
the testator’s only intestate heirs. Anti-lapse rules are unnecessary in
such cases, as Dukeminier and Sitkoff explain, “because a multigenerational class absorbs the concept of representation familiar from inheritance law.”136 Perhaps for this reason, New York recently amended its
anti-lapse statute to exclude gifts to “issue” and “descendants,” preferring to let the definition of those terms found in the intestacy law determine the distribution of such gifts.137
131
See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 21110(a) (West 2015) (if known to testator); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 633.273(2) (West 2015); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.3(a)(3)
(McKinney 2015).
132
See, e.g., In re Gray’s Estate, 23 A. 205, 206 (Pa. 1892); In re Slack Tr., 220 A.2d
472, 472–73 (Vt. 1966); Chaffin, supra note 11, at 306–08.
133
See Hedges v. Payne, 154 N.E. 293, 294–95 (Ind. Ct. App. 1926) (noting the conflict
with the weight of authority); In re Frolich Estate, 295 A.2d 448, 451 (N.H. 1972) (noting the
judicial trend toward discarding traditional rule) (citing In re Estate of Jackson, 471 P.2d 278,
281 (Ariz. 1970) and Slack, 220 A.2d at 474); Indus. Nat’l Bank of R.I. v. Glocester Manton
Free Pub. Library of Glocester, 265 A.2d 724, 729 (R.I. 1970) (noting the widespread criticism of the common law rule).
134
See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 21111(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-65(b) (West 2015);
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-11(c) (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-37; N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.4; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-42(b) (West 2015); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514(11) (West 2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.52(D)(2) (West
2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-6-20 (West 2015); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-604(b)
(amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969).
135
See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.3(a)(3).
136
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 379 n.19.
137
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-3.3 cmt. The definition of issue can be found
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b. Anti-Lapse and Words of Survivorship and Substitution
In Patricia Roberts’s estimation, “[t]he most frequently litigated issue in the lapse statute cases is whether the testator has indicated a contrary intent.”138 Courts and policy makers have been unable to reach a
consensus on this question, with some taking the position that words of
survivorship merely speak in favor of the statute and that a substitutional
gift would be required to circumvent it. The majority of jurisdictions,
however, take the position that a testator’s deliberate choice of words of
survivorship should defeat the application of the default rule, whether or
not she specifies a taker in substitution. There is good reason to adhere
to the majority rule.
The anti-lapse statute is a default rule based on the notion that in
making a gift to a parent the testator contemplated the benefit of such
parent’s children, in the absence of a contrary intention being expressed
in the will. Therefore, if the testator qualifies a bequest with a specific
requirement that the beneficiary survive him, a majority of courts and
some legislatures will not apply the anti-lapse statute to the testator’s
will.139 Avoiding the operation of the statute in these jurisdictions is a
simple matter of making it clear that survivorship of the legatee is essential. In contrast, a minority of courts have ruled that mere words requiring survival are not enough to defeat the anti-lapse statute.140 The drafters of the UPC concur, reasoning that “mere words of survivorship
merely duplicate the law-imposed survivorship requirement deriving
from the rule of lapse.”141 In other words testators who use survivorship
language are simply choosing to articulate the default rule of law requir-

in § 1-2.10.
138
Roberts, supra note 56, at 346–47.
139
See, e.g., In re Estate of Stroble, 636 P.2d 236, 241 (Kan. 1981) (claiming this approach is “almost universally applied by the courts in this country”); Polen v. Baker, 752
N.E.2d 258, 262 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Erlenbach v. Estate of Thompson, 954 P.2d 350
(Wash. Ct. App. 1998); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-603 (West 2015); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-2-603(C) (West 2015) (An anti-lapse provision does not control where the testator
has explicitly made survival a requirement, using phraseology such as “if he survives me” or
to “my surviving children.”); Jeffrey A. Cooper, A Lapse in Judgment: Ruotolo v. Tietjen and
the Interpretation of Connecticut’s Anti-Lapse Statute, 20 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 204, 210,
213 (2007).
140
See, e.g., Ruotolo v. Tietjen, 916 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2007); see also Halbach & Waggoner,
supra note 3, at 1110 (claiming that “language of survivorship in documents does not supply
trustworthy indication of intention contrary to the anti-lapse statute”).
141
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603 cmt. (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969)
(emphasis in original).

Storrow - FINAL (Do Not Delete)

466

QUINNIPIAC LAW REVIEW

6/1/2016 7:50 PM

[Vol. 34:447

ing beneficiaries to survive the testator.142 Under this reasoning, when a
testator includes words of survivorship but does not include a substitute
devise, his intent regarding what should become of the property in the
event of lapse is incomplete, and the anti-lapse statute should apply.143
A couple of cases involving what I will call provisions requiring
dual or alternative survivorship suffice to illustrate the difficulty courts
have in evaluating the interplay between words of survivorship and antilapse statutes. The will in In re Estate of Ulrikson contained a provision
bequeathing the residue to the testatrix’s brother and sister in equal
shares.144 The will specifically dictated that if one of the siblings predeceased the testatrix, the surviving sibling would take the entire residue.145 But in this case, both siblings predeceased the testatrix, and only
the brother left issue. A lawsuit between the testatrix’s heirs at law and
the brother’s issue ensued. The heirs argued that the provision in the will
placed an absolute condition of survival on the gifts to both siblings,
and therefore, since both siblings predeceased the testatrix, neither had
an entitlement to the property that could be preserved by the anti-lapse
statute.146
The Minnesota Supreme Court was unconvinced. Referring to the
wills law presumption against intestacy, it reasoned that the testatrix intended for the requirement of survivorship to apply only in the event
there were survivors. The testatrix simply had not contemplated that
there might not be a survivor, and for this reason her expressed intention
was incomplete.147 The anti-lapse statute thus operated to complete the
expression of her intent by preserving the residue for the two children of
the testatrix’s brother, to the exclusion of the seven other heirs at law
who otherwise would have shared the residue equally with them.148 Although the Ulrikson decision is obviously limited to will provisions requiring dual or alternative survivorship, the comments to the UPC cite it
for the extravagant proposition that in Minnesota words of survivorship
do not override the anti-lapse statute.149
In a similar case, a different court also used the presumption against
142

See, e.g., Kubiczky v. Wesbanco Bank Wheeling, 541 S.E.2d 334 (W. Va. 2000).
See Mary Louise Fellows, Traveling the Road of Probate Reform: Finding a Way to
Your Will (A Response to Professor Ascher), 77 MINN. L. REV. 659, 678 (1993).
144
290 N.W.2d 757, 758 (Minn. 1980).
145
Id.
146
Id. at 759.
147
Id.
148
Ulrikson, 290 N.W.2d at 759.
149
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603 cmt. (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969).
143
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intestacy to rule in favor of applying the anti-lapse statute despite the
testator’s gift in substitution to the survivor of his two brothers.150 The
North Carolina appeals court also gave intent-based reasons for its ruling. In bequeathing his property to his two brothers “or to the survivor,”
the testator failed to contemplate that both of his brothers might predecease him.151 This court went further than the Ulrikson court, though, in
remarking that there was “no clear intent on Testator’s part that either
brother outlive him in order for his gift to be effective.”152 In other
words, the court believed that a stronger expression of survivorship
would be necessary for the anti-lapse statute to be overridden. Since the
testator had not specified what should happen to his estate if both of his
siblings predeceased him, his brothers’ issue took the property to the exclusion of the heirs at law.153
Ulrikson and Early do not establish that words of survivorship,
standing alone, are insufficient to trump the anti-lapse statute. They are
cases of dual or alternative survivorship and are based wholly on the fact
that neither testator expressed what to do with the estate should both siblings die first. Since the testators’ intentions regarding the events that actually occurred remained unknown, the anti-lapse statute applied. These
cases establish that anti-lapse statutes work best when they fill in gaps in
wills in which testators have not expressed their intentions regarding
survivorship. This is the fashion in which rules of construction generally
function. This position has the virtue of respecting the oft-cited principle
that a court should strive to give effect to every word of a last will and
testament.154 The opposite position, by contrast, assumes that in some
instances the testator’s words are simply a mouthpiece for the wisdom of
the common law.
The problem with the theory that survivorship language by itself
expresses an incomplete intention is that it does not allow the words employed by the testator to convey any meaning. It instead assumes that the
testator has used them to parrot the lapse doctrine. The words of survivorship are thus emptied of their particular meaning for the testator because, where the same testator does not use survivorship language in the
will, the lapse rule will apply in the same fashion. This feeble method of

150

Early v. Bowen, 447 S.E.2d 167, 172 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 172–73.
154
See, e.g., Carlson v. Sweeney, 895 N.E.2d 1191, 1197 (Ind. 2008); Lemmon v. Wilson, 28 S.E.2d 792, 800 (S.C. 1944).
151
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interpretation effaces the possibility that the testator intended for the
words to negate the anti-lapse statute. By requiring survivorship, the reasonable testator likely intends for the beneficiary to possess and control
the property and to make conscious decisions about its disposition. A
predeceased beneficiary cannot make such decisions. By requiring the
beneficiary to survive her death, a testator is not even remotely expressing an intention that the beneficiary’s descendants should take in his
stead.
Those who hold that words of survivorship express no more than
the rule of lapse have argued that words of survivorship might be
deemed ambiguous and need to be construed. The comments to the
UPC, for example, stress that a judge is always at liberty to call for extrinsic evidence to interpret the will as circumventing the anti-lapse statute.155 Of course, there is usually nothing particularly ambiguous about
an express survivorship requirement. Thus, advocates would have a difficult time arguing that a will is ambiguous when the words used are so
plain on their face. Most courts would be justified and would prefer to
employ a plain-language interpretation of words of survivorship and
would use the rules of lapse and anti-lapse to fill in the testator’s unspoken intentions regarding the disposition of his property.156
c. Anti-Lapse and Disinheritance
Yet another constructional problem on which the courts disagree is
the effect of disinheritance on the application of an anti-lapse statute.
This problem arises when the will disinherits the person who would otherwise take the property by operation of an anti-lapse provision. For example, in In re McKeon’s Estate, the testator bequeathed property to her
sister but specifically disinherited her niece.157 The court ruled that the
anti-lapse provision was not triggered by these facts because “the testatrix clearly expressed in her will her intent that the child of the legatee
was to take no part of her estate.”158 The court reasoned that the antilapse statute “was not intended to nullify the right of the testator to select
the objects of his bounty and to specify the conditions and limitations

155
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-601 cmt. (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969); id.
§ 2-603 cmt.
156
Aron Leslie Suna, Disinheritance and the Anti-Lapse Statute, 26 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 105, 111 (1969).
157
46 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351 (Sur. Ct. 1944).
158
Id. at 350.
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upon any legacy.”159 Indeed, given that the statute is meant to carry out a
probable intent, it should not be applied when the testator’s intent is so
clearly contrary to it.160
It is thus extraordinary to find other courts applying the anti-lapse
statute in like circumstances. In Bruner v. First National Bank, the testatrix bequeathed the residue of her estate to her daughter Dressie and disinherited Dressie’s son Raymond.161 As in McKeon, the residuary beneficiary predeceased the testatrix. The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that
the specific disinheritance of Raymond did not prevent him from taking
the testatrix’s estate via the anti-lapse provision.162 The court believed
that the language employed by the testatrix merely exhibited an intent to
prevent her grandson from taking under the pretermitted heirs statute and
that depriving him of the estate as a taker under the anti-lapse provision
was beyond her purpose.163 This limited-purpose theory was employed
as well in In re Carleton.164 There the testator had bequeathed $1,000 to
each of her grandchildren but in a codicil revoked this provision, stating
“‘I feel that I should not remember [Horace M. Carleton] in any financial way in my Will.’”165 The testator’s will also contained a bequest to
her son Alexander, Horace’s father.166 Since Alexander had predeceased
the testator, Horace claimed a share of the bequest to his father under the
anti-lapse statute. The court construed the codicil as relating solely to the
bequest of $1,000 and not, as its language would suggest, to a broader
disinheritance of Horace that would include any benefit from the bequest
to Alexander.167 As such, the testator was presumed to have intended for
Horace to be included as a taker of the bequest to Alexander.168
d. Anti-Lapse and Will Substitutes
Whether anti-lapse provisions apply to will substitutes such as life
insurance policies, pension plans, and pay-on-death or transfer-on-death
financial accounts remains an open question.169 Very few legislatures
159

Id. at 351.
Id.
161
443 P.2d 645, 645–46 (Or. 1968).
162
Id. at 646.
163
Id. at 647.
164
151 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Sur. Ct. 1956).
165
Id. at 340.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 341.
168
Bruner, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
169
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 33, at 348.
160
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have moved in this direction by enacting the 1989 revision of the UPC’s
article 6, requiring the beneficiaries of pay-on-death bank accounts and
transfer-on-death security accounts to survive the owners of such accounts,170 and by enacting the 1990 revision of the UPC’s article 2,
which includes an anti-lapse provision that covers non-probate transfers
and applies to beneficiaries who are grandparents, descendants of a
grandparent, or stepchildren of the decedent.171 As is true of the UPC’s
anti-lapse provision applicable to wills, the anti-lapse provision applicable to will substitutes is rendered inoperative by the inclusion of an “alternative beneficiary designation” but not by mere “words of survivorship.”172 If the predeceased beneficiary is not among the group of
beneficiaries for whom a descendant will be substituted, the property is
retained by whichever beneficiary survives or in the estate of the last
surviving party to the account.173 This approach mirrors anti-lapse legislation on lapsed residuary devises.
The Uniform Probate Code’s extension of anti-lapse principles to
remainders in inter vivos trusts is controversial in that it overturns a familiar principle of the law of future interests—that a beneficiary need
not survive to the time of possession. The attempted reform is meant to
harmonize the law of wills and the law of future interests by moving the
vesting of the remainder in the beneficiary from the time of the creation
of the trust to the time of distribution. The assumption underlying the reform is that the donor of a future interest has in mind preserving the
property for the issue of the beneficiary in the event the beneficiary does
not survive the date of distribution. This assumption resembles what is
assumed to be a testator’s desire to preserve testamentary bequests for
the issue of predeceased beneficiaries with whom he has a consanguineous or adoptive relationship.174 Harmonizing the law of wills and trusts
makes the most sense when a trust is revocable. As with wills, the settlor
of a revocable inter vivos trust is free to make changes to his estate plan
to respond to the deaths of beneficiaries. But irrevocable inter vivos

170

UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 6-212(a)–(b), 6-307 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N

1969).
171

Id. § 2-706(b).
Id. § 2-706(b)(3)–(4).
173
Id. §§ 6-212(b)(2), 6-307.
174
See, e.g., 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5.5 (West 2015). In re Estate of Button, 490
P.2d 731, 734 (Wash. 1971) (construing inter vivos trust and remarking, “A gift to be enjoyed
only upon or after the death of the donor is in practical effect a legacy, whether it is created in
an inter vivos instrument or in a will.”).
172
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trusts and other present transfers, such as those evidenced by deeds,175
do not permit such changes. In drafting such a trust, a settlor would not
only have to consider drafting around anti-lapse principles that have historically never applied to trusts but would also have to consider the possibility that the trust property will remain in his estate in the event a predeceased beneficiary has no issue surviving the settlor. Nonetheless,
states that choose to enact an anti-lapse provision applicable to trusts are
unlikely to distinguish between revocable and irrevocable trusts.176 Like
the UPC’s insistence that words of survivorship are not enough to trump
an anti-lapse provision, the extension of anti-lapse principles to remainders has not caught on, and many courts have rejected arguments urging
such an extension.177
Although the idea of treating revocable trusts like wills appeals to
me given the similarities between these instruments, I wish to suggest a
different direction that the law might take. My proposal is that we treat
lapsed devises more like remainders. In short, instead of bringing antilapse concepts into trust law, I advocate bringing vesting concepts into
wills law in the specific situation where the beneficiary predeceases the
testator leaving a valid will of her own. I believe it is more in keeping
with the average testator’s intention that the estate of a predeceased beneficiary who has been as wills-minded as she assume control of the bequeathed property. To address at least one of the controversial aspects of
my proposal, one that the courts of Maryland have had to contend with
given the similarity of that state’s law to my proposal, I would limit the
applicability of the rule to beneficiaries who have predeceased the testator by a maximum of one year. This period of time would give the testator a reasonable time to learn of and respond to the beneficiary’s death.
The Maryland law and my proposal are explored in more detail in Part
III, below.
2. Simultaneous Death
Problems posed by deaths occurring “simultaneously” have fascinated the probate bar and the wider public, and for good reason. The increasingly fast pace of living in the 20th century, made possible by new

175

See, e.g., Zweifel v. Doughterty, 761 S.W.2d 215, 218 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing a present interest conveyed by a deed).
176
See, e.g., 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5.5.
177
See, e.g., Tait v. Cmty. First Tr. Co., 425 S.W.3d 684, 687–88 (Ark. 2012); First Nat’l
Bank of Bar Harbor v. Anthony, 557 A.2d 957, 960 (Me. 1989).
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forms of transportation, has made contemporaneous deaths a more prominent feature of the administration of estates.178 A true simultaneous
death would not satisfy the condition of surviving the testator imposed
by the common law on will beneficiaries. But simultaneity of deaths is
not itself the problem. Indeed, due to the infinite divisibility of time,
there is surely never a truly simultaneous death.179 The problem lies in
the fact that the law is left to contend with our inability to calculate, especially in connection with deaths in a common disaster, the precise time
of death of the testator and the legatee. For this reason, some deaths may
appear to be simultaneous. The indeterminacy of the order of death places a heavy burden on those claiming entitlement to the estate by virtue of
survivorship. Furthermore, the common law offers them no presumption
of either simultaneous death or survivorship in such situations.180 The
problem relates to cases of lapse and to wills that expressly condition a
bequest upon the survival of the recipient.
The solution to this problem devised by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) in 1940 was the
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (“USDA”). Although the USDA was
meant to apply to cases where title to property “depends upon priority of
death,” to joint tenancies, tenancies by the entirety, and insurance policies, the Act was limited to cases where no evidence showed that the
parties had died other than simultaneously.181 The Act provided that,
where “there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously, the property of each person shall be disposed
of as if he had survived.”182 The act propounded a useful presumption as
an aid to distributing the estates of those who had died contemporaneously, but it did not diminish the amount of litigation aimed at establishing other than simultaneous death by adducing sufficient evidence that
the beneficiary had survived the testator. Thus, gruesome details involving the rates and manner of decomposition of the corpses,183 inhalation

178

See UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT pref. note (amended 1953), 8B U.L.A. 338

(2014).
179

Legacies and Devises, supra note 71, at 692.
See UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT pref. note (amended 1953), 8B U.L.A. 338
(2014); People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286, 291 n.2 (N.Y. 1984); Glover v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d
227, 231 (Tex. 1963).
181
UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT § 1 (amended 1953), 8B U.L.A. 342 (2014).
182
Id.
183
See, e.g., Specht v. Estate of Hartman, 20 Pa. D. & C. 3d 735, 736 (Ct. Comm. Pl.
1981).
180
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of noxious fumes during a catastrophe,184 evidence of a violent struggle
to survive,185 response of the pupils to light,186 the presence of brain
waves,187 the meaning of which required the testimony of expert witnesses, were the unsavory features of many cases in which survivorship
was unclear. Litigating such cases in the past has not only been gruesome but administratively inefficient.188
From the early 1940s until as late as 1972, the 1940 USDA was
adopted in 47 states, the District of Columbia, and the United States Virgin Islands.189 Twenty-two states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands later repealed the 1940 USDA in favor of the 1993 revised
USDA,190 discussed below. The 1940 version was also later repealed in
both Michigan and Oregon, which had by that time enacted 120-hour
survivorship requirements for both wills and intestacy.191 Ohio, which
never had enacted the 1940 version of the USDA, enacted the 1993 version in 2002.192
3. Survival by 120 Hours
The “complete inadequacy of the USDA to resolve many survivorship problems”193 led NCCUSL to expand the amount of time required
for survival under that provision beyond any amount of time to 120
hours, thus bringing the USDA into line with the UPC, which has required survival by 120 hours from its earliest iteration in 1969.194 It had
been common prior to that time for testators drafting their wills with the
assistance of legal counsel to express “that a particular devisee or all devisees must survive the testator for a stated period.”195 Estate planners
184

See, e.g., In re Bucci, 293 N.Y.S.2d 994, 996 (Sur. Ct. 1968).
See, e.g., In re Campbell’s Estate, 641 P.2d 610, 613 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
186
See, e.g., Janus v. Tarasewicz, 482 N.E.2d 418, 420 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985).
187
See, e.g., id. at 420–21.
188
Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 3, at 1094.
189
UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT (amended 1953), 8B U.L.A. 337–41 (2014); UNIF.
SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT (1993), 8B U.L.A. 317 (2014).
190
UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT (1993), 8B U.L.A. 317, 319–22 (2014).
191
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.2104 (intestacy), 700.2702 (wills) (West 2015);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 112.572, 112.578 (West 2015).
192
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2105.31 et seq. (2015).
193
J. Rodney Johnson, The New Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, 8 PROB. & PROP. MayJune 1994, at 22, 23.
194
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-104(a), 2-702 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1969).
195
Effland, supra note 22, at 341. See also SCOLES ET AL., supra note 25, at 404 n.1. See,
e.g., In re Leete Estate, 803 N.W.2d 889, 894 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (with respect to probate
185
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recommend such provisions to avoid the difficulties and inefficiencies
inherent in cases where deaths occur within a short period of time, not
only in cases of common disasters. Courts, too, are sympathetic to the
problem and have in the past devised ways of circumventing it. In one
case, for example, the court construed the phrase “in a common disaster”
to include a beneficiary who had been involved in the same automobile
accident but who had actually survived the testator by a full two
hours.196 At the time of the accident, Florida did not require the survival
of a will beneficiary by 120 hours.197
Deaths that occur closely in time often affect the distribution of
jointly held property. Under the USDA, failure to survive a co-owner by
the requisite 120 hours would result in half of the property being distributed as if one of the co-owners had survived the other and the other half
being distributed as if the other co-owner had survived. A Michigan case
applying such a provision involved Frederick and Barbara Leete, an elderly couple who owned, as tenants by the entirety, a cottage that had
been in Frederick’s family for about 100 years.198 The husband had left
the car running in the attached garage of their home, and the couple was
asphyxiated by the noxious fumes. Barbara died that day, but Frederick
lingered for four more days. Frederick’s share of the cottage went to his
children in accordance with his will. But the wife’s daughter claimed a
half interest in the cottage because Frederick had not survived Barbara
by more than 120 hours.199 Thus, even though Barbara predeceased
Frederick, the cottage was not yet his sole property when he died. Frederick’s children vigorously opposed the claim, but Barbara’s daughter
prevailed.200
The problems of “double administrative costs”201 and “multiple
administrations”202 that result from property being probated in rapid succession through two different estates prompted NCCUSL, in the 1969
iteration of the UPC, to require that a devisee survive the testator by 120
hours.203 The UPC also applies the survival-by-120-hours requirement to

estate, husband’s will required wife to outlive him by 30 days; otherwise, property would go
to children from a previous marriage).
196
Silver v. Schroeder, 474 So. 2d 857, 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
197
Id. at 861.
198
Leete, 803 N.W.2d at 894.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 903.
201
Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 3, at 1095.
202
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-104 cmt. (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969).
203
Id. § 2-702.
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intestate succession,204 but not if the result would be a taking of the
property by the state in escheat.205 Many states now have 120-hoursurvival requirements.206 They are not limited to wills and intestacy but
can also be found in provisions designed for the protection of the testator’s spouse and children, including the elective share,207 the homestead
allowance,208 and provisions relating to will substitutes.209 Where the enactment of a 120-hour statute applicable to wills and intestacy does not
explicitly repeal a simultaneous death provision modeled on the 1940
USDA, some courts have determined that the simultaneous death act has
been implicitly repealed.210
Double administration results in additional death taxes and the
passing of the property directly to unintended beneficiaries.211 The Restatement suggests that the policy behind the rule is “to ensure that a decedent’s property passes to a beneficiary who can personally benefit, as
opposed to a beneficiary who became deceased a short time later, meaning that the property would ultimately pass to that beneficiary’s heirs.”212
The period of required survival, however, is only five days, so the personal benefit rationale seems a bit far-fetched. Some states, though, impose longer periods of required survival time,213 and, of course, a testator
is free to provide for an even longer time in her will. In one case, for example, the period of survival required by the will was thirty days. Because the beneficiary survived longer than thirty days, the testator’s
property was ultimately distributed to that beneficiary’s heirs at law, rather than the alternate beneficiaries named in the will.214
The legal effect of the failure of a beneficiary to survive for the required amount of time is that the beneficiary is deemed to have predeceased the testator.215 As with anti-lapse provisions, if the will shows a
204

Id. § 2-104.
See, e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2104(10) (West 2015) (intestacy statute).
206
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 397.1002 (West 2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 700.2104 (West 2015); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2304 (West 2015); id. § 30-2339; N.J.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-32 (West 2015); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2104(10).
207
N.Y. EST. TRUSTS & POWERS LAW § 2-1.6 (McKinney 2015).
208
See In re Estate of Martelle, 32 P.3d 758, 762 (Mont. 2001).
209
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-702(b) (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969).
210
See, e.g., UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Craig, 26 P.3d 510, 516 (Ariz. 2001) (holding that 120-hour statute implicitly repealed earlier simultaneous death statute).
211
Effland, supra note 22, at 342.
212
In re Leete Estate, 803 N.W.2d 889, 901 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1999)).
213
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-401 (West 2015).
214
In re Estate of Corrigan, 358 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Neb. 1984).
215
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-702 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969); MD.
205
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contrary intention, the statute does not apply. In addition, as with antilapse statutes, the problems that stem from the application of this rule
have largely to do with whether the testator has taken sufficient steps to
indicate that he does not want the rule to apply to a particular devise.
The testator’s contrary intention216 might take the form of requiring the
beneficiary to survive a specific event. But finding a contrary intention
can be particularly tricky if the will in question is not quite so specific,
for example, if it contains an explicit survivorship provision but does not
specify any specific duration of survivorship.
III.

LAPSE AND INTENTION

The arbitrariness of the lapse doctrine has found it few defenders.
Nonetheless, the doctrine has never received the thorough criticism it
deserves. Commentators have chosen largely to deplore how it disadvantages the testator’s close relations or to quibble about the details of
the narrow statutory alterations to it that today we find embodied in antilapse legislation.217 The main problem remains determining whether anti-lapse principles do an adequate job of tempering the perceived inadequacies of the lapse doctrine.
One way of addressing this question is to focus on the role of antilapse statutes in promoting testamentary intent. Carrying out the testator’s actual intent is, after all, the “polestar” of wills law and the primary
inspiration for the tenet that “no will has a brother.”218 Given the vagaries of testamentary preferences that stem from the relationships testators
have actually experienced, the search for a testator’s actual intent can
feel like a “search after a phantom.”219 The reality is that, as Mechem
has commented, “[p]robably no such thing exists.”220 This may be why
the primary tools for ascertaining a testator’s actual intent, the plain
meaning rule and the admission of extrinsic evidence, are frequently inadequate to the task at hand and why the law of wills as a result is so replete with presumptions of what a reasonable person would intend. We
would do well to admit, as Fellows has, that the law does not do a parCODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-401; Jordan v. Anderson, 421 N.W.2d 816, 819–20 (N.D.
1988).
216
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-601 (West 2015).
217
Cooley, supra note 43, at 374.
218
Hammons v. Hammons, 327 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Ky. 2010); see also In re Corrigan, 358
N.W.2d 501, 503 (Neb. 1984).
219
In re Chalmers’ Will, 190 N.E. 476, 478 (N.Y. 1934).
220
Mechem, supra note 65, at 2.
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ticularly good job of discovering a deceased person’s preferences where
none have been expressed.221 Left with doubts about a testator’s actual
intent, courts are left to conjure the “average actual intent” or probable
intent of reasonable testators.222 Legislators are left to speculate on what
most people would want under the circumstances and to develop guideposts to help decision makers come as close to the intent of the testator
as the evidence before them will allow.223 Anti-lapse statutes play a part
in this interpretive alchemy through their supposed reasonable approximation of a testator’s “probable wishes.”224
Anti-lapse statutes are blunt, as Susan French has theorized, precisely because the intent-discerning enterprise is so prone to error.225 But
in another sense, anti-lapse statutes are not blunt enough. They are so
narrow as to seem tentative. And their relentless emphasis on consanguineous succession imports principles of intestate succession into the
construction of a will in a manner that seems incongruous if not indeed
intent-defeating.226 In Mark Ascher’s estimation, “[M]ost testators expect their wills to dispose of their property completely—without interference from a statute of which they have never even heard.”227 To borrow so heavily from intestacy to fill what we perceive to be gaps in wills
seems short-sighted and imprecise. To be fair, as Verner Chaffin has put
it, “No anti-lapse statute can ever be expected to reach desirable results
in all cases, since legislation of necessity must pour everyone into the
same mould and cannot hope to meet the varying needs and desires of
different individuals under infinitely varying circumstances.”228 There is
no justification, however, for making intestate distribution the default
setting in cases in which the testator’s will is not incomplete; he has given no indication that he desires the beneficiary to have actual possession
of the bequest, and he exhibits his understanding of the importance of
wills by drafting one in the first place. Seen in this light, the traditional
221

Fellows, supra note 66, at 637.
Casner, supra note 118, at 751.
223
See Mechem, supra note 65, at 2 (noting that it is impossible to secure data as to average actual intent).
224
Cooley, supra note 43, at 374.
225
See French, supra note 5, at 348.
226
Cooley, supra note 43, at 394 (“A liberal admixture of public policy in favor of direct
issue of testators must be read into this decision to obscure the fact that any such generality
will manifestly interfere with the intent of many testators who were fully apprised of the state
of their families when they made their wills.”).
227
Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better, or More Like the
Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REV. 639, 654 (1993) (emphasis in original).
228
Chaffin, supra note 11, at 309–10.
222
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approach to anti-lapse legislation seems less geared to ascertaining testators’ reasonable intent than it does to resolving doubtful cases quickly
and efficiently. An emphasis on efficiency would explain why anti-lapse
statutes rely so heavily on the preference for consanguineous succession
we find in intestacy law.
Fashioning an appropriate rule to address lapse will require us to
define with more clarity what we mean when we speak of the intention
of a testator. Given the insistence that finding and carrying out the intention of the testator are what wills law strives toward above all, it is no
wonder that the dominant message about the importance of intention has
obscured the primary drivers of testamentary transfers, the desires and
expectations of the testator and the actions taken by both the testator and
the executor or administrator of the estate. A will is essentially a set of
declarations laying out what the testator desires to become of his property when he dies. A will can serve other purposes, too, of course, such as
expressing the testator’s values or giving voice to other matters.229 But
when we speak of testamentary intentions, we mean primarily the testator’s desired disposition of his property. In addition to expressing the
testator’s desires, a will also embodies a testator’s expectation that the
law will uphold his wishes through the probate process after he dies.230
Thus, the action of a testator in executing a will and the actions he expects his directions will bring about after his death are both essential to
realizing a testator’s individually crafted estate plan.231
Intestacy, by contrast, since it is an estate plan by operation of law
or by default, is premised not on the testator’s action but her inaction.
The agent appointed to distribute an intestate’s property after his death
carries out the estate plan the state has enacted to take effect in default of
a valid will. Although “[a] person can intentionally refrain from action
without trying to do so[,]”232 it is generally believed that decedents die
without wills because they fear death and the cost of executing wills, not

229

Karen J. Sneddon, Speaking for the Dead: Voice in Last Wills and Testaments, 85 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 683, 729, 740–48 (2011) (describing ethical wills and explanations in wills).
230
Jane Baron, Intention and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630, 633 (1992); Anti-Lapse Statutes,
supra note 78, at 1219 (describing the coordination of “testamentary desire with legal effect”).
Of course the law does refrain from carrying out provisions in wills that are against public
policy. See, e.g., Girard Tr. Co. v. Schmitz, 20 A.2d 21, 36 (N.J. Ch. 1941) (provision would
sow discord in family).
231
See JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 80,
92 (1983).
232
Peter Cane, Mens Rea in Tort Law, in INTENTION IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 129, 131
(Ngaire Naffine et al. eds., 2001).
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because they prefer the default estate plan crafted by the state.233
What we have come to call intention in wills is a convenient but
clumsy shorthand for a formalized expression of desire, a “faded form of
intention,” as John Searle puts it, “with the Intentional causation
bleached out.”234 Firm distinctions have been drawn between desire and
intention in the criminal law,235 but in speaking of wills, by desire I do
not mean to suggest that the testator must experience pleasure or satisfaction or harbor some benevolent motive in picturing the property in the
hands of the beneficiary. I mean merely that she “aims at” the property
being within the beneficiary’s control.236 When a testator devises Blackacre to X, for example, she may be motivated to benefit or burden X, but
what is certain is that X’s control of Blackacre is her aim. It matters little
whether the testator expresses her desire with “I desire that X have
Blackacre” or “I want Blackacre to go to X” or “I direct my executor to
convey Blackacre to X.” The testator wants X to have Blackacre and by
embodying this expression of her desire in her will directs that that result
be brought about upon her death. Thus, despite the theory that Blackacre
will vest in X immediately upon death of the testator,237 the testator does
not actually intend to give Blackacre to X but desires that Blackacre be
given to her. The testator acts to make his wishes known in a correctly
executed document, but the actions he envisions occurring with respect
to his property are by definition ones that he will not be present to bring
about. An agent, usually named in the will, will be responsible for putting its provisions into action. In essence, then, the will is a set of directions to an agent, perhaps the one the testator has named in the will but
certainly the one a court will appoint. The law encourages the expectation a testator has that some agent will take control of carrying out her
desires after he has passed away.238
Some will object to my definition of intention in terms of desire by
pointing out that the testator’s declarations must be sufficiently directive
so as to carry them beyond mere precatory language. The words must
show testamentary intent, not merely a request or entreaty that stops

233

See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 71–72.
SEARLE, supra note 231, at 36.
235
Sir Anthony Mason, Intention in the Law of Murder, in INTENTION IN LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY 107, 113–15 (Ngaire Naffine et al. eds., 2001).
236
G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION, 18 (2d ed. 1985); Cane, supra note 232, at 131.
237
In re Estate of Fitzsimmons, 86 A.3d 1026, 1035 (Vt. 2013) (referring to “the rule of
immediate passage”).
238
See 96 C.J.S. Wills § 902 (2016).
234
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short of a command or direction.239 In practice, precatory language rarely gets in the way of discerning a testator’s testamentary aims because it
is invariably used in connection with a gift outright that is in no way
ambiguous. In other words, when the words are meant to govern conduct
they are an “expression of testamentary desire” but when they are a mere
“expression of opinion or offering of advice” they can be construed as
“nothing more.”240 The statement “I desire A to have Blackacre” would
be considered precatory if mentioned in conversation or scribbled on a
to-do list.241 It would be considered testamentary if embodied in a validly executed will.242 The proper execution of the will is sufficient to carry
what would otherwise be considered precatory language into the realm
of testamentary intent.
The real question raised about the use of precatory language in
wills is whether the testator intended to impose a condition on a beneficiary’s use of the property.243 The classic example of precatory language
is one where the testator bequeaths Blackacre outright “to [A] and it is
my wish and desire that [B] should be able to live on the land during her
life.”244 The testator intends that A receive Blackacre but does not intend
to make it compulsory for A to allow B to live there. She is merely making a request.245 In other words, X wants to leave it up to A to decide
how to behave toward B but wants A to know her preferences in the
matter.246 If T makes a monetary bequest “to C with the hope that C will
care for D,” she wants C to decide whether he will use the money to care
for D and hopes he will. None of the precatory language in these examples makes the gifts to A and C conditional; it thus does not get in the
way of A and C’s obtaining control of the property. In both cases, the
testator has stated what she wants carried out by her agent and what she
239

Precatory, 8 THE GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW 252 (1984).
See GARDNER, supra note 122, at 33.
241
See, e.g., In re Henry’s Estate, 248 N.W. 853, 855 (Mich. 1933) (holding document
was not a will but a letter requesting assistance with modifying a will).
242
See In re Collias’ Estate, 233 P.2d 554, 556 (Cal. 1951); In re Bosworth, 55 N.Y.S.2d
422, 425 (App. Div. 1945); Langehennig v. Hohmann, 163 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex. Comm’n
App. 1942).
243
See, e.g., Byars v. Byars, 182 S.W.2d 363, 364–67 (Tex. 1944); Singer v. Singer, 196
S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (using expression of desire that trustees “keep said
estate together for ten years after my death”).
244
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 33, at 456.
245
See, e.g., Byars, 182 S.W.2d at 364; Banks v. Banks, 262 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953).
246
See, e.g., Lux v. Lux, 288 A.2d 701, 703 (R.I. 1972) (expressing “desire” that real estate be sold to a member of her family in the event that such property is sold to pay estate’s
debts).
240
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wants left to the discretion of A and C.247
These reflections on the meaning of testamentary intentions establish that they are desires formalized as directions to an agent. As mentioned above, testamentary intentions reflect the testator’s willsmindedness, a state of mind focused on providing a mechanism by
which testamentary desires can be carried out. These understandings tell
us little about what a testator wants to happen to his property if his chosen beneficiary predeceases him. Since wills law is committed above all
to carrying out the testator’s intent, it seems anomalous to revert so automatically to a regime resembling intestate distribution, the embodiment of the absence of testamentary intent. Such an approach completely
eliminates the testator’s wills-mindedness from the equation, substituting for it an outcome that seems above all aimed at easing the administration of estates. In this posture, the state is deciding what the testator’s intentions should be rather than doing its utmost to honor his
expectations. Since the usual testamentary bequest aims to place property within the control of the beneficiary, it would be more in keeping with
the testator’s wills-mindedness to allow the property to be controlled by
the predeceased beneficiary’s will. Where the beneficiary has a will of
her own, she has demonstrated a wills-mindedness with which the testator can directly identify. The traditional defenses of the rule of lapse and
the anti-lapse regimes that have arisen to temper its ills completely ignore the likelihood that in choosing a particular beneficiary a testator is
not seeking to benefit his issue, whether or not the beneficiary is a close
family member and whether or not the beneficiary dies first. Instead, unless the testator places specific conditions on the testamentary gift, he
wishes the beneficiary to assume control of the property to the extent of
allowing a predeceased beneficiary’s own will to direct the disposition
of it.
My proposal, then, is for amending the currently prevailing antilapse provisions that are reflections of intestate distribution norms. The
new default rule should be that a bequest does not lapse when the predeceased beneficiary’s estate is disposed of through a validly executed will
and the beneficiary died within one year of the testator. The will of the
beneficiary should be probated,248 in order to remove all doubt about the
247

See, e.g., In re Oliver’s Will, 42 N.Y.S.2d 865, 870 (Sur. Ct. 1943).
By statute, wills are supposed to be presented and filed in the clerk’s office. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.901(1) (West 2015); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 252.201 (West 2015).
But not every will is probated, as in cases where a surviving spouse is already in possession of
the property in the estate and simply continues in possession. See, e.g., In re Estate of Zim248
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beneficiary’s intentions and the enforceability of his will’s provisions.
The default rule favoring the beneficiary’s will could be overridden
where the will itself requires that the beneficiary survive the testator or
provides that a gift lapses on the death of a beneficiary before distribution of the estate.249 Such provisions would indicate that the testator did
not want a predeceased beneficiary’s estate plan to control the disposition of the property, probably because she desired the beneficiary to
have actual possession of the property. The rule would not apply where
the predeceasing devisee died intestate. Intestacy may be an estate plan
by operation of law, but it is unlikely that those who have died without a
will have consciously elected the scheme designed for them by the state.
To distribute the property to the predeceasing devisee’s heirs at law in
such cases would, in the words of the Supreme Court of Alabama, implicate the court in making a will for her.250 In such circumstances, “[t]he
court cannot say what would have been the wish of the testatrix had she
had a chance to express it.”251 If the beneficiary is one of the testator’s
heirs at law, however, the property should be distributed to the beneficiary’s heirs.
This is not the first proposal for expanding anti-lapse, though prior
ones have perhaps not been quite as far-reaching.252 I believe, though,
that there is good reason for broadening anti-lapse provisions. First, as
we have seen above, the lapse doctrine is difficult to square with a testator’s intention. Second, anti-lapse statutes are tepid attempts to address
this problem and rely, in a wills context, on intestacy law’s preference
for consanguineous succession. NCCUSL’s move to expand the class of
legatees to which anti-lapse applies is a step in the right direction, but it
does not go far enough. The real problem is that substituting issue does
not appear to be in keeping with the policy for carving exceptions out of
the lapse rule in the first place.
Currently, only one jurisdiction in the United States distributes
lapsed property to the predeceased beneficiary’s heirs or devisees. The

merman, 485 P.2d 215, 217 (Kan. 1971); Wetzel v. Watson, 328 S.E.2d 526, 528 (W. Va.
1985).
249
See, e.g., Estate of Hampe, 193 P.2d 133, 135 (Cal. 1948) (discussing a will requiring
a beneficiary to survive the issuance of the decree of distribution); In re Greacen, 54 N.Y.S.2d
426, 427 (Sur. Ct. 1945).
250
Morgan Cty. Nat’l Bank of Decatur v. Nelson, 13 So. 2d 765, 768 (Ala. 1943).
251
Id.
252
See, e.g., Chaffin, supra note 11, at 287, 294 (advocating expansion of Georgia’s antilapse statute to class gifts where one or all of the class die either before or after the execution
of the will but before the testator).
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Maryland statute substitutes the beneficiary’s heirs if she died intestate
and her legatees if she died testate.253 A more complete abrogation of the
default lapse doctrine can scarcely be imagined. As Eugene Scoles put it,
“How, if at all, is Maryland’s lapse statute different from simply rejecting the basic lapse rule that requires the devisee to survive the testator?”254 As noted above, this approach is based on the legal theory of fictitious survivorship, a theory that the standard American anti-lapse
statute rejects in favor of substituting the issue of the predeceased legatee.
Maryland’s anti-lapse statute is not without its problems. Simpson
v. Piscano,255 the first case in which Maryland’s high court first construed the statute, involved the reciprocal wills of a husband and wife,
wherein the estate of each was devised to the other. Bernard predeceased
his wife Leona by a little over a year. Upon Leona’s death, the quandary
was that Bernard’s will directed his lapsed legacy back to Leona.256 A
court applying an anti-lapse provision that does not rely upon the principle of intestacy law that property is never distributed to or through the
estate of a predeceasing heir257 will eventually confront a case where the
beneficiary of the predeceased beneficiary’s estate will also have predeceased the testator. This is not a problem per se, of course. In Simpson,
the real problem was that the beneficiary’s will directed the property
back to its source, the testator herself.258 The superior court sensibly
concluded that under those specific circumstances, the anti-lapse statute
becomes inoperative.259 Since Bernard died testate, the statute directed
the terms of his will to control the disposition.260 It was not until Bernard’s will was found to bequeath the property to Leona, that the statute
could no longer be applied.261 Instead of having the property bounce

253

MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-403(b) (West 2015).
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 25, at 405.
255
419 A.2d 1059 (Md. 1980).
256
Id. at 1061–62.
257
Case law and commentary are clear that the issue or heirs entitled to take under an anti-lapse provision are those who survive the testator, not the legatee. See, e.g., McAllister v.
McAllister, 167 N.W. 78, 81 (Iowa 1918) (only heirs of predeceased legatee who survived
testator were entitled to take); Anti-Lapse Statutes, supra note 78, at 1218 (“[I]f the legatee
dies intestate, his heirs take not by substitution but by descent from the legatee, and are determined as of the date of the legatee’s notional death, immediately after that of the testator.”).
258
Simpson, 419 A.2d at 1061.
259
Id. (“[W]hen the property arrives back at the starting gate . . . the anti-lapse statute
becomes ineffective . . . .”).
260
Id. at 1061.
261
Id.
254
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back and forth between the two estates, the court’s approach was to take
the statute as far as it would go, and the result was as if Leona had died
intestate.262 The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed this result.263
The question of the application of Maryland’s statute to reciprocal
wills is perhaps easier to resolve than is the hypothetical posed by the
dissent in Simpson. If Leona’s will had devised her estate to X who predeceased her, and X’s will had bequeathed everything to Y, who also
predeceased Leona, “[w]hen does the chain end?”264 The dissent found it
“ludicrous” and “absurd” “to apply a fiction which would place beneficiaries in a chain composed of persons whom the testatrix would have no
intention to benefit and who were strangers.”265 In fairness, this is precisely what the statute appears to contemplate. What the dissent misconstrues is that the testamentary mindset of a testator may well be to benefit the strangers whom her named beneficiary wished to benefit. When a
beneficiary does outlive the testator, the testator understands quite well
that the beneficiary has the power to benefit strangers with gifts of the
property and certainly intends “to pass the power of testamentary disposal along with her gift.”266 That is why my proposal is limited to situations where the predeceased beneficiary also has a will. I would limit the
breadth of anti-lapse reform to cases where the beneficiary has also acted with testamentary intentionality. I am not at all convinced, for the
reasons given above, that the same rationale applies where the beneficiary has died intestate and would even be more opposed to the property’s being distributed through successive intestate estates. I am also convinced that, in cases where a beneficiary has died more than one year
before the testator, the testator’s wills-mindedness should lead her to revisit her will and make clear that she wants the predeceased beneficiary’s beneficiaries to receive the bequest if in fact she does.
In further defense of the Maryland statute, it bears repeating that the
provision does not distribute the property to the predeceased beneficiary’s estate but merely substitutes, in the testator’s estate, the beneficiaries named in his will. Indeed, under a traditional anti-lapse statute, it
has been emphasized many times that the property does not pass to the
representative of the predeceasing legatee or under his will267 but under
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Simpson, 419 A.2d at 1061.
Id. at 1063.
264
Id. at 1066 (Cole, J., dissenting).
265
Id. at 1067.
266
See Anti-Lapse Statutes, supra note 78, at 1220.
267
Mechem, supra note 65, at 21 (citing cases).
263
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the will of the testator such that they become devisees in that will by
substitution.268 As was also mentioned previously, an anti-lapse statute
based on the model we find in Maryland is not a statute that requires the
reopening of probate of an estate that has already been closed. The statute merely tells us where to locate the evidence necessary to complete
the disposition of the testator’s estate. In this way, it allows us to move
beyond old notions about expectancies269 and one’s estate being capable
of disposing only of property he possesses upon his death.270 Furthermore, referring to the terms of the legatee’s will to make the distribution
in no way runs the risk of engaging in a “double probate.” Further support for this approach to lapse is documented in the section that follows.
IV.

DOCTRINAL SUPPORT FOR A REVISED APPROACH
TO ANTI-LAPSE

The analysis above establishes that when a testator bequeaths property to a beneficiary who predeceases the testator leaving a valid will,
the more likely scenario is that the testator intends for the beneficiary’s
will to control the lapsed gift. In this section, I discuss two doctrines relating to the interpretation of wills and an estate planning device all of
which offer some support for my analysis.
A. Acts of Independent Significance and Extrinsic Evidence
Wills act as a mean to combat fraud by requiring that testamentary
transfers satisfy certain formal requirements. It is believed that formalities such as signing the will at the end and having witnesses attest have
evidentiary and cautionary functions that counterbalance the ease with
which potential heirs can make statements of self-interest that the testator cannot be present to contradict.271 Although the primary purpose of
such acts may be to combat the fraud of self-seeking heirs, they place a
heavy burden on testators as well. Since their estate plans must be fully
embodied in a properly executed writing, the law circumscribes the ability of testators to change their estate plans informally. It would not be
268

R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-6-19 (West 2015) (“[S]uch devise or bequest shall not
lapse, but shall take effect and operate as a devise or bequest from the testator to that issue . . . .”); In re Conner’s Estate, 36 N.W.2d 833, 841 (Iowa 1949); Chaffin, supra note 11, at
272, 276.
269
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. McGee, 101 A. 682, 686 (Md. 1917).
270
See, e.g., Glenn v. Belt, 7 G. & J. 362, 367–68 (Md. 1835).
271
See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 15, at 157.
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adequate, for example, for a will to direct that property be distributed according to a memorandum that was prepared after the execution of the
will.272 Once a testator has executed his will, he cannot make an enforceable testamentary decision that alters the disposition of his probatable estate beyond revoking it entirely or in part without formally executing a codicil or a new will.273
This is not to suggest that wills law is devoid of flexible rules of interpretation. The doctrine of independent significance or nontestamentary acts refers to beneficiary or property designations in wills that are
determined by “acts or events that have a lifetime motive and significance apart from their effect on the will.”274 “Lifetime motive” refers to
a motive of the testator,275 not someone else; otherwise, the doctrine
would be swallowed by the necessity in almost every construction of a
will to resort to extrinsic facts.276 Take class gifts, for example. In a gift
to A’s children, the children of A living at the time of the testator’s decease will take the property. A may have predeceased the execution of
the testator’s will, in which case there will be no additional children of A
than exist at that time. If A outlives the execution, A may begin having
children or have additional children before the testator’s death. Since
A’s decision to have children or not to have them is not a “lifetime motive” of the testator, we would not say that A’s having children is an act
of independent significance. Likewise, the direction to “give ten dollars
to each of the members of my family whose name is recorded in the
family Bible kept by my Uncle Ned” refers to the acts of Uncle Ned and
not of the testator.277 The misnomer “facts of independent significance”278 leads us to believe that any fact that helps determine the identity of the takers or the property under the will is a fact of independent
272

See, e.g., Cyfers v. Cyfers, 759 S.E.2d 475, 481–82 (W. Va. 2014).
This might not be completely accurate in the context of holographic wills. There are
cases that allow the testator to change the will in his handwriting without signing it again. See,
e.g., Stanley v. Henderson, 162 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1942).
274
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 323.
275
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 25, at 160 (referring to acts “peculiarly within the control
of the testator”).
276
See id.; see also WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 69, at 281 (citing Stubbs v. Sargon, 40
Eng. Rep. 1022, 1024 (Ch. 1838)).
277
This example is taken from SHAFFER & MOONEY, supra note 46, at 86.
278
See, e.g., Tierce v. Macedonia United Methodist Church, 519 So. 2d 451, 456 (Ala.
1987); MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 15, at 249; SCOLES ET AL., supra note 25, at 160;
SHAFFER & MOONEY, supra note 46, at 86. The term “acts of independent significance” may
be confusing to some who are familiar with this term from insurance law. In that body of law,
an act of independent significance is one that breaks the chain of causation. See, e.g., Doe v.
State Budget and Control Bd., 523 S.E.2d 457, 458 (S.C. 1999).
273
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significance. This may be true as a matter of will construction, where
courts use extrinsic evidence to identify the property and the takers of
it,279 but referring to this process as involving facts of independent significance distracts us from the purpose of the doctrine which is to determine what acts of the testator beyond the execution of the will can be
given effect in a distribution of the estate.
“Lifetime motive and significance” refers, in addition, to nontestamentary purposes and effects, that is, “not be[ing] solely for the purpose
of supplementing the will.”280 The concern is that the testator may be altering his estate plan (beyond revocation) without the required formalities. Many of the testator’s decisions regarding his property will affect
what the beneficiaries ultimately take but will have little or nothing to do
with a desire to alter his estate plan. We should be satisfied that such actions need not be the subject of testamentary formalities as long as they
“have a substantial significance apart from their impact on the will.”281
What if, instead of a gift to A’s children, the testator’s will contains gifts
of “‘the automobile that I own at my death’” to “my children” and of
$1,000 “‘to each person who shall be in my employ at my death?’”282 As
long as we are satisfied that the decisions regarding what automobile to
own or whom to employ have to do with matters apart from modifying
the estate plan, there should be no objection to allowing them to influence the final disposition of the property. For example, the identity of
the employees, the children, and the car the testator drives likely lie in
the testator’s desire to drive a particular car, his wanting a family of a
certain size, and his convictions about how he should run his business
rather than how he wants his estate distributed. They are “the kind of
thing that would occur without regard to their effect on the will.”283 We
have faith in the use of these events because they are performed “for
some reason other than the effect it would have on the testamentary disposition, notwithstanding that it might occur or be done, or did occur or
was done, for the purpose of affecting the testamentary disposition.”284
Even what the residue consists of may be influenced by many actions of
279

See In re Tipler, 10 S.W.3d 244, 246–47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (citing SCOTT ON
TRUSTS § 54.2 (4th ed. 1987)).
280
Tierce, 519 So. 2d at 456.
281
SCOLES ET AL., supra note 25, at 160 (emphasis omitted).
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This example is taken from DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 323–24, and is
slightly altered from the original.
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SCOLES ET AL., supra note 25, at 160.
284
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.7
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
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the testator after the will’s execution.285 Bequests of “contents” are no
different.286 The cases decided and the statutes passed to make clear that
such bequests do not include cash or “titled property”—e.g., property
evidenced by deeds or bank passbooks—arise less from a concern that
the testator has engaged in a nonformalized testamentary act than from
the conviction that his intent in describing the contents of a drawer or
box in so pedestrian a way could not have encompassed such items.287
Cases involving wills that direct that the estate be distributed using
someone else’s estate plan bear some resemblance to my proposal that a
predeceased beneficiary’s will control the lapsed devise. Such a case
was In re Tipler.288 In this case, Gladys Tipler’s will directed that her estate be distributed to the beneficiaries named in her husband James’s
will if James predeceased her. He did, having executed a will several
years after she did. Tipler’s heirs challenged the provision because
James’s will was not yet in existence when she executed her will.289 The
court upheld the devise as a proper exercise of the doctrine of independent significance.290 The Tipler decision cites a number of other cases
where wills that direct the distribution of property in accordance with the
will of another were upheld as legitimate exercises of the independent
significance doctrine.
Despite the court’s analysis in Tipler, it is important to recognize
that it technically is not a case involving acts of independent significance. This is because James’s will was his act, not Gladys’s. The case is
no different from one construing a will that gives property to “my surviving sisters” or “the current mayor of New York City.” All that is required in such cases is extrinsic evidence to clarify the identity of the
beneficiary. Indeed, the court in Tipler appears unsure whether the case
presents a simple matter of identifying the beneficiaries through extrinsic evidence or whether it might be akin to a power of appointment or
some looser form of incorporation by reference.291 But this case has
nothing to do with incorporating unattested material into the testator’s
will. Nor does it involve a testator’s giving someone the right to “finish”
his estate plan via a power of appointment. The testamentary significance of the beneficiary’s will makes this a simple matter of extrinsic
285

SCOLES ET AL., supra note 25, at 160.
See, e.g., Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Hale, 18 N.E.2d 432, 433 (Mass. 1939).
287
See, e.g., Creamer v. Harris, 106 N.E. 967, 968 (Ohio 1914).
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10 S.W.3d 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
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Id. at 245–46.
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Id. at 249.
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See id. at 247–48.
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evidence. The use of the beneficiary’s will would simply be to identify
the beneficiaries named therein, and there would be no need to reopen
the estate of the beneficiary.292 For this reason, the creditors of the deceased beneficiary would have no interest in the property as they would
if the gift were a gift to the beneficiary’s estate.293
B. Powers of Appointment
Another legal theory that bears some resemblance to my proposal is
the general testamentary power of appointment. A power is the grant of
authority to dispose of the property of another. Although it is not itself a
property right, in its broadest sense a power allows the donee of the
power “to do any act which the donor himself or herself might lawfully
perform.”294 This would include the donee’s appointment of the property
to himself.295 But a power can also be narrower, crafted so that the donee
of the power may appoint the property only to someone within a defined
class of persons or may appoint the property only at a certain time, for
example only during his lifetime or only at his death.296 In effect, a testator may appoint someone to “finish” his estate plan via provisions in the
will of the donee of the power. The two wills are then construed together.
Does a testator, contemplating lapse, intend “to pass the power of
testamentary disposal along with” whatever bequests he has made to
predeceased legatees?297 Under current law, a legatee who survives the
testator has precisely this power. But in most jurisdictions, the mere fact
that the legatee has not outlived the testator is, under the dominant
American approach to anti-lapse, a justification for depriving him of it.
Nonetheless, there are at least two senses in which the power-ofappointment device reflects my proposal.
First, “[u]nder certain circumstances, the will of the testator and the
will of another may be construed together.”298 A will conferring a power
292

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.1
cmt. b, illus. 16 (AM. LAW INST. 1999); Id. § 1.2 cmt. g; cf. Id. § 16.1 cmt. c (class gift to
“heirs”).
293
See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-403(c) (West 2015); MCGOVERN ET AL.,
supra note 15, at 421 (“They would take directly from the testator, so the bequest would not
be taxed in Alice’s estate or subject to claims of her spouse or creditors.”).
294
72 C.J.S. Powers § 1 (2016).
295
Id. § 8.
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Id.
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Anti-Lapse Statutes, supra note 78, at 1220.
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96 C.J.S. Wills § 965 (2005).
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of appointment by will and the will of the donee exercising such power
is one such instance.299 The result is that “the interests or estates created
by the exercise of a power of appointment take effect as if created by the
instrument creating the power, and the appointee or beneficiary takes title under the donor of the power and not under the donee.”300 Under my
proposal, as with powers of appointments, the provisions made by a predeceased beneficiary under a will would also be read into the will of the
testator.301 Reading the wills together in this way would allay the concern that distributing lapsed property to the beneficiaries named in the
legatee’s will would necessitate two probates.
Second, if we analogize a predeceased beneficiary to the donee of a
power and her will to the exercise of that power, then, as with powers of
appointment, if the legatee fails to execute a will or it is invalid, the
power would be deemed ineffectively exercised. In such a case, the
property would be distributed as it would pursuant to the failure to exercise a power.302 The “default takers” in a case of lapse would be the testator’s residuary legatees or his heirs at law or, if applicable, the substituted takers under the relevant anti-lapse provision. In short, if the
predeceasing beneficiary had no valid will, then my proposed rule would
not apply.
Although the power-of-appointment theory supports my proposal to
change the contours of the typical anti-lapse statute, several characteristics of valid powers of appointment conspire to make this theory less
supportive of my proposal than the principles of will interpretation discussed above. The primary problem with this theory is that a power of
appointment cannot simply be read into a will that contains a lapsed legacy but must expressly be created by the donor of the power.303 Of
course, the proposal I am making is one that has to do with wills that
have no such language. I am certainly not proposing that, to avoid lapse,
a testator would be required to direct that a gift to a predeceased beneficiary be distributed in accordance with that beneficiary’s will. On the

299
Republic Nat’l Bank of Dallas v. Fredericks, 274 S.W.2d 431, 440 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954), rev’d on other grounds, 283 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1955).
300
72 C.J.S. Powers § 29 (2005).
301
Second Nat’l Bank of New Haven v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 283 A.2d 226, 228
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1971); DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 33 at 708; WAGGONER ET
AL., supra note 69, at 989.
302
See 72 C.J.S. Powers § 30 (2005).
303
In re Estate of Krokowsky, 896 P.2d 247, 250–51 (Ala. 1995); McCuddy v. Citizens
Fidelity Bank & Tr. Co., 505 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Ky. 1974); In re Estate of Kohler, 344 A.2d
469, 471 (Pa. 1975).

STORROW - FINAL (Do Not Delete)

2016]

WILLS AND SURVIVAL

6/1/2016 7:50 PM

491

contrary, I am proposing a default measure that would apply in the absence of a specific intent to override it. The rule that a power must expressly be created to exist at all does not support this proposal.
Another difficulty is that, like the creation of powers, the exercise
of a power of appointment must also be unequivocal.304 In other words,
the instrument claimed as an exercise of the power must actually manifest an intention to exercise the power the donee has been given. Since
the type of power that could serve as a model for my proposal is necessarily general, then a general residuary clause would have to be sufficient to exercise the power.305 But a general residuary clause is sufficient
to exercise a power of appointment in only a minority of jurisdictions.306
The requirement that the exercise of the power by the beneficiary must
be executed with specificity cannot be carried out by a beneficiary who
is not aware that her will will serve to “appoint” lapsed property from
the will of the testator. The rules governing the creation and exercise of
powers of appointment, then, do not support my proposal to reform antilapse principles.
For the foregoing reasons, the power of appointment resembles my
proposal only superficially. The donor and the donee of the power need
to demonstrate too much intentionality to create and to exercise it. My
proposal would operate by law and would not involve the affirmative
acts of the testator in creating and exercising interests resembling a power of appointment or require the beneficiary to make affirmative statements in a will regarding devises to himself that lapse.
Given how embedded the principles of lapse and anti-lapse are in
the law of wills, existing doctrine offers only limited support for my
proposal to reform them. Although there are sound reasons for the reform I propose, as was true of the wave of anti-lapse legislation that currently holds sway within the American law of wills, such a reform will
have to await the action of state legislatures.
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See Hartford-Conn. Tr. Co. v. Thayer, 134 A. 155, 159 (Conn. 1926).
See Beals v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 326 N.E.2d 896, 900 (Mass. 1975); In re
Smith’s Will, 108 N.Y.S.2d 290, 295 (App. Div. 1951); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
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Susan French, Exercise of Powers of Appointment: Should Intent to Exercise Be Inferred from
a General Disposition of Property?, 1979 DUKE L.J. 747, 753.
305

Storrow - FINAL (Do Not Delete)

492

6/1/2016 7:50 PM

QUINNIPIAC LAW REVIEW

V.

[Vol. 34:447

CONCLUSION

Although the common law doctrine of lapse seems a harsh way to
address cases in which a will beneficiary predeceases a testator, it remains a foundational principle of the law of wills. The policy rationale
for the doctrine is a matter of some speculation, with some commentators suggesting it reflects the fact that the dead cannot own property and
others suggesting that it reflects sensible estate planning. Rules that govern the disposition of property in cases of simultaneous death and that
dictate that a beneficiary must survive the testator for a certain period of
time help refine our understanding of how survival is established in the
wills context, but they do not otherwise alter the common law of lapse.
The law of lapse appears to be a legal engine doing very little to
advance wills law’s primary goal—finding and carrying out the testator’s intention. It acts as a default rule, operating in the absence of a stated intention to the contrary. The desirability of an alternative to the traditional disposition of property in lapse cases is firmly in evidence. Antilapse statutes exist in almost every state. They purport to remedy the remorselessness of the lapse doctrine by presuming that a testator would
prefer his testamentary gift to a close family member to go to that relative’s issue in the event of lapse. Anti-lapse rules operate in a manner
familiar from intestacy law, favoring lines of consanguinity and descendants over ancestors.
We have little cause to believe that the reasonable testator, having
taken the time to draft a will in the first place, would prefer lapsed devises to close relatives to be disposed of in a fashion so closely resembling what the state dictates should become of the property of those who
die without wills. Instead, being wills-minded, a testator would likely
prefer the valid testamentary plan of a predeceased beneficiary to control
the disposition of the property if the beneficiary had predeceased her
within a relatively short period of time. This new approach to lapse does
not find support in the device it might at first blush resemble, the power
of appointment, but it does find support in will interpretation principles
and in the fact that an estate is just as valid a testamentary beneficiary as
a living person. As an antidote not only to the law of lapse but to the narrow anti-lapse statutes that currently serve as exceptions to it, a willsminded approach to lapse will prevent us from making the preferences
of the state for efficiency and ease of administration serve as stand-ins
for what the law of wills is supposed to promote above all else.

